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Abstract
A well studied instantiation of Dung’s abstract theory of argumentation yields argumentation-
based characterisations of non-monotonic inference over possibly inconsistent sets of
classical formulae. This provides for single-agent reasoning in terms of argument and
counter-argument, and distributed non-monotonic reasoning in the form of dialogues
between computational and/or human agents. However, features of existing formali-
sations of classical logic argumentation (Cl-Arg) that ensure satisfaction of rationality
postulates, preclude applications of Cl-Arg that account for real-world dialectical uses
of arguments by resource-bounded agents. This paper formalises dialectical classical
logic argumentation that both satisfies these practical desiderata and is provably ratio-
nal. In contrast to standard approaches to Cl-Arg we: 1) draw an epistemic distinction
between an argument’s premises accepted as true, and those assumed true for the sake
of argument, so formalising the dialectical move whereby arguments’ premises are
shown to be inconsistent, and avoiding the foreign commitment problem that arises in
dialogical applications; 2) provide an account of Cl-Arg suitable for real-world use by
eschewing the need to check that an argument’s premises are subset minimal and con-
sistent, and identifying a minimal set of assumptions as to the arguments that must be
constructed from a set of formulae in order to ensure that the outcome of evaluation
is rational. We then illustrate our approach with a natural deduction proof theory for
propositional classical logic that allows measurement of the ‘depth’ of an argument,
such that the construction of depth-bounded arguments is a tractable problem, and
each increase in depth naturally equates with an increase in the inferential capabilities
of real-world agents. We also provide a resource-bounded argumentative characterisa-
tion of non-monotonic inference as defined by Brewka’s Preferred Subtheories.
Keywords: Classical Logic, Argumentation, Dialectic, Rationality Postulates, Natural
Deduction, Preferred Subtheories, Bounded Reasoning.
1. Introduction
Argumentation is a form of reasoning that makes explicit the reasons for the conclu-
sions that are drawn and how conflicts between reasons are resolved. While informal
studies of argumentation have a rich tradition, recent years have witnessed intensive
study of logic-based models of argumentation and their use in formalising agent rea-
soning, decision making, and inter-agent dialogue [11, 53]. Much of this work builds
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on Dung’s seminal theory of abstract argumentation [26], and the theory’s provision
of argumentative characterisations of nonmonotonic inference. Given a possibly in-
consistent set of logical formulae (base) one defines the arguments and a binary attack
relation denoting that one argument is a counter-argument to another. Various devel-
opments of Dung’s theory additionally accommodate a preference relation over argu-
ments, which is used to determine which attacks succeed as defeats [1, 9, 43]. The
resulting directed graph of arguments related by defeats, referred to as an argumenta-
tion framework (AF), is then said to be ‘instantiated’ by the base. Evaluation of the
justified arguments is then based on the intuitive principle that an argument is justi-
fied if all its defeaters are themselves defeated by justified arguments. The conclusions
of justified arguments identify the ‘argumentation defined’ non-monotonic inferences
from the instantiating base.
The widespread impact of Dung’s theory is in large part due to this characteri-
sation of non-monotonic inference in terms of the dialectical use of arguments and
counter-arguments familiar in everyday reasoning and debate. The theory thus pro-
vides foundations for reasoning by individual computational and human agents, and
distributed non-monotonic reasoning involving agents resolving conflicts amongst be-
liefs or deciding amongst alternative actions, or negotiating allocations of resources
(e.g., [2, 3, 8, 38, 40, 44, 45, 48, 58]). These ‘monological’ and ‘dialogical’ appli-
cations have motivated the study of rationality postulates for logical instantiations of
AF s [15, 16], as well as desiderata for practical applications [27, 44].
This paper focuses on classical logic instantiations of AF s (Cl-Arg) [1, 33, 43].
Features of the current paradigm have been shown to provide sufficient conditions for
satisfaction of the rationality postulates. However, these features preclude satisfac-
tion of practical desiderata that account for modelling real-world uses of arguments
by resource-bounded agents. This paper therefore aims at an account of Cl-Arg that
satisfies both practical desiderata and the rationality postulates.
In Section 2 we review Dung’s theory, Cl-Arg, and the rationality postulates. In
Section 3 we argue that monological and dialogical applications of Dung’s theory
require formalisation of real-world uses of argument suitable for resource-bounded
agents. However, current approaches to Cl-Arg tacitly assume that all arguments de-
fined by a base can be constructed and included in anAF , and that prior to inclusion the
legitimacy of each constructed argument is verified by checking that its premises are
consistent and not redundant in the strong sense that their conclusion is not entailed by
any proper subset of the premises. These assumptions are computationally unfeasible
(even in the propositional case) for real-world uses of argument by resource-bounded
agents. However, they are proposed as sufficient conditions for satisfaction of the con-
sistency and closure postulates [15] for first order Cl-Arg with preferences [43]1, and of
the ‘non-contamination’ postulates [16] for propositional Cl-Arg without preferences.
Moreover, checking the legitimacy of arguments prior to inclusion in an AF fails to
account for real-world uses of argument. Firstly, in real-world uses the inconsistency
of arguments’ premises is typically demonstrated dialectically. Secondly, agents do
1Consistency postulates closely related to [15] are also studied for propositional Cl-Arg without prefer-
ences in [33].
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not interrogate premises for subset minimality. Rather, it is the specific proof-theoretic
means for constructing arguments that determines whether or not premises are redun-
dantly used in deriving the conclusion; that is, redundant in the obvious sense that they
are syntactically disjoint from the remaining premises and the conclusion.
Section 3 then presents a new account of first order Cl-Arg that satisfies practi-
cal desiderata. Our approach introduces a new notion of argument that distinguishes
amongst the premises accepted as true and those supposed true ‘for the sake of argu-
ment’. We can therefore model a ubiquitous feature of dialectical practice, whereby
the inconsistency of a set of premises Γ is shown dialectically, by defeats from ar-
guments that claim that a contradiction is implied if one supposes (for the sake of
argument) the truth of Γ. The distinction also solves the so called foreign commit-
ment problem that arises in dialogical applications when agents are forced to commit
to the premises of their interlocutors in order to challenge their arguments [17]. We
also drop the computationally demanding checks on the legitimacy of arguments, and
define ‘partially instantiated’ AF s that include subsets of the arguments defined by a
base. We thus accommodate real-world uses of argument in which agents do not (or
may not have sufficient resources to) construct all arguments from a base when deter-
mining whether arguments are justified. We show that our account satisfies standard
properties of Dung’s theory. We also show that despite dropping the legitimacy checks
on arguments and making minimal assumptions as to the arguments defined by a base
for inclusion in an AF , the consistency and closure postulates are satisfied (where the
latter are adapted to account for the fact that not all defined arguments may be included
in the AF ). Moreover, in contrast with [43], these postulates are satisfied assuming
any preference relation over arguments.
Finally, in Section 3 we identify the notion of an argument whose use of obviously
redundant (in the sense described above) premises can be excluded proof-theoretically,
in contrast with the use of impractical subset-minimality checks We generalise the
‘non-contamination’ postulates defined for propositional instantiations of AF s in [16],
to first order instantiations. We then show that despite dropping consistency and subset
minimality checks on arguments’ premises, our account of first order Cl-Arg satisfies
these postulates under the assumption that preference relations are ‘coherent’.
Standard accounts of Cl-Arg typically leave implicit the specific proof theoretic
means by which one entails a conclusion from a set of premises. In Section 4 we
illustrate use of our dialectical account of argumentation by formalising arguments as
intelim trees: a new natural deduction formalism for propositional classical logic [20,
21] that allows measurement of the ‘depth’ of an argument such that the construction of
depth-bounded arguments is a tractable problem, and each increase in depth naturally
equates with an increase in the inferential capabilities of real-world agents. We then
show that AF s instantiated by arguments up to any given depth satisfy the rationality
postulates and practical desiderata. Furthermore, intelim natural deduction allows for a
notion of proof that excludes arguments that use obviously redundant premises. Section
4 also develops a resource-bounded argumentative characterisation of non-monotonic
reasoning in Brewka’s Preferred Subtheories [13].
Section 5 reviews related work; in particular the practical desiderata described in
[27], and works [34, 61] that exclude arguments that make use of inconsistent formulae
so as to ensure satisfaction of [16]’s non-contamination postulates. We then conclude
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in Section 6 and outline directions for future work.
2. Background
2.1. Classical Logic Instantiations of Dung’s Argumentation Theory
We first recapitulate Dung’s argumentation theory [26].
Definition 1. [Dung Framework, Conflict Free and Acceptability] A Dung argu-
mentation framework (AF ) is a tuple (A, C), where A is a set of arguments and C ⊆
A×A is a binary attack relation defined over A. Let S ⊆ A. Then:
• S is conflict free iff ∀X,Y ∈ S: (X,Y ) /∈ C.
• X ∈ A is acceptable with respect to S iff ∀Y ∈ A such that (Y,X) ∈ C :
∃Z ∈ S such that (Z, Y ) ∈ C.
Definition 2. [Dung Semantics] Let (A, C) be an AF , and S ⊆ A conflict free. Then
S is an admissible extension iff X ∈ S implies X is acceptable w.r.t. S.
• An admissible extension S is a complete extension iff ∀X ∈ A : X is acceptable
w.r.t. S implies X ∈ S;
• S is a preferred extension iff it is a set inclusion maximal complete extension;
• S is the grounded extension iff it is the set inclusion minimal complete extension;
• S is a stable extension iff ∀Y ∈ A, if Y /∈ S then ∃X ∈ S s.t. (X,Y ) ∈ C.
For T ∈ {complete, preferred, grounded, stable}, X is sceptically, respectively credu-
lously justified under the T semantics if X belongs to all, respectively at least one, T
extension.
Extensions can also be defined in terms of a AF ’s characteristic function F(A,C):
F(A,C)(S) = {X|X is acceptable w.r.t. S}, where S ⊆ A.
Then for any conflict free S ⊆ A, S is: admissible iff S ⊆ F(A,C)(S); complete iff
S = F(A,C)(S) (i.e., S is a fixed point of F(A,C)); grounded iff S is the least fixed
point of F(A,C); preferred iff S is a maximal fixed point of F(A,C).
Dung explicitly considered ‘instantiations’ of AF s by sets of logical formulae ∆,
and showed that his theory provides a general framework for various species of non-
monotonic reasoning. Given ∆ in some logic L, the conclusions of the justified argu-
ments (i.e., the argumentation defined inferences from the instantiating ∆) are exactly
those obtained from ∆ by the inference relation of the logic. Dung thus provides argu-
mentation based characterisations of logic programming, Reiter’s Default Logic [54]
and Pollock’s Inductive Defeasible logic [47].
We now review classical logic instantiations of AF s (Cl-Arg). We assume a full
first order language L consisting of the usual logical operators ∧,∨,→,¬,∀,∃, a
countable set of individual variables, a (possibly empty) set of function symbols of
various arities, where as usual function symbols of arity 0 are interpreted as constant
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symbols, and a non-empty set of predicate symbols of various arities that includes the
0-ary symbol uprise interpreted as a patently false atomic formula (i.e. one that is always
false under any interpretation of the language). A term is an individual variable or con-
stant, or a functional expression f(t1, . . . , tn) where each ti is a term. The wffs of L
are defined in the usual way. We shall use lower case Greek letters to refer to arbitrary
wffs, and upper case Greek letters, possibly with subscripts, to refer to sets of classical
wffs. The language of propositional classical logic is then defined as a sub-language
of L that consists only of the usual logical connectives and predicate symbols of ar-
ity 0 (i.e., ‘propositional atomic formulae’) uprise, a, b, c, . . . , z. We also assume the first
order classical consequence relation `c, and write Cn(∆) to denote {α|∆ `c α}. If
Cn(∆) = L we say that ∆ is inconsistent; else ∆ is consistent. We will make use of
the following notions of a complement function and ‘symbols’ in a set of wff.
Definition 3. [Complement Function] Let φ, ψ be classical wff. Then φ = ψ if
φ = ¬ψ; else φ = ¬φ.
Definition 4. [Symbols] Let ∆ be a set of classical formulae. Then symbols(∆) = {P |
P is either a predicate or function symbol in ∆}.
Note that in case ∆ is a set of propositional formulae, symbols(∆) consists of all
the propositional atomic formulae in ∆, whereas if ∆ is an arbitrary set of first order
formulae, symbols(∆) consists of the predicate, function and constant symbols in ∆.
By defining symbols in arbitrary sets of first order formulae in this way, we are able to
generalise the non-contamination postulates defined for propositional argumentation in
[16], to the first order case (see later in Section 2.2).
Arguments are defined with respect to a set or ‘base’ B of classical formulae, which
we assume does not contain uprise; in the sequel uprise will be exclusively used to express that
an inconsistency has been reached when constructing an argument.
Definition 5. [Base] A base B is a finite set of classical wff such thatuprise /∈ symbols(B).
Definition 6. [Classical Logic Arguments] [1, 12, 33] (∆, φ) is an argument defined
by a base B, if ∆ ⊆ B, and:
1. ∆ `c φ
2. Cn(∆) 6= L (∆ is consistent)
3. ¬∃∆′ ⊂ ∆ such that ∆′ `c φ (∆ is said to be ‘subset minimal’).
∆ and φ are respectively referred to as the premises and conclusion of (∆, φ).
[33] studies propositional classical logic instantiations of AF s, identifying attack
relations which ensure satisfaction of postulates closely related to [15]’s consistency
postulates. For well-behaved attack relations, the premises of arguments in stable
extensions of an AF instantiated by B are simply the maximal (under set inclusion)
consistent subsets of B. Hence, [1, 43] employ preferences over arguments to enable
argumentation based arbitration of conflicts in a classical base. X successfully attacks
(defeats) Y iff X attacks Y and Y is not strictly preferred to X . In this way, a defeat
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Figure 1: i) Solid arrows are undermine attacks. If in addition to undermine attacks that target only premises,
one also allowed attacks targeting conclusions, then one would also have the attacks represented by dotted
arrows. In ii) and iii), arrows are defeats.
relation D ⊆ C is defined. The notions of conflict freeness, acceptability of argu-
ments, and extensions are then defined exactly as in Definitions 1 and 2 above (with D
replacing C).
In [43], a general framework – ASPIC+ (building on ASPIC [15]) – for instantiat-
ing AF s is defined. ASPIC+ identifies properties of preference relations and logical
instantiations of AF s that use strict (deductive) and defeasible inference rules, such
that these properties ensure satisfaction of [15]’s consistency and closure rationality
postulates. ASPIC+ studies first order classical logic instantiations in which arguments
are built from premises in a given base B, and strict inference rules {φ1, . . . , φn →
φ|φ ∈ Cn({φ1, . . . , φn}}. Hence arguments can be represented as in Definition 6,
where an argument’s premises entail an argument’s conclusion through application of
a single strict inference rule encoding the entailment condition 1 in Definition 6. (Note
that the consistency check on an argument’s premises is enforced in [43], whereas the
subset minimality check (condition 3 in Definition 6) is not enforced; we comment on
this later). Then:
Definition 7. [Undermine Attacks] (∆, φ) undermine attacks (∆′, φ′) on ψ if φ = ψ
for some ψ ∈ ∆′.
Henceforth we may say that X ‘undermines’ rather than ‘undermine attacks’ Y .
Definition 8. [Elementary Arguments] Let ∆ be a set of classical wff. Then ∀α ∈ ∆,
({α}, α) is said to be the ‘elementary argument’ defined by α.
Undermine attacks only target premises, and as illustrated in the example below, can
equivalently be said to target the ‘elementary arguments’ defined by such premises.
Henceforth, we will for the sake of simplicity restrict ourselves to propositional exam-
ples.
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Example 1. Let B be a base {a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b}. A subset A′ of the arguments defined
by B are shown in Figure 1i). Undermine attacks are indicated with solid arrows. For
example, F attacks A on the premise a (i.e., F attacks A on the elementary argument
A), and F attacksH on a (i.e., F attacksH onA). H attacks F on ¬a∨¬b (i.e., onC),
andG attacksH on b (i.e., onB). There are three stable extensions – call them E1, E2
and E3 – such that {G,A,C} ⊆ E1, {F,B,C} ⊆ E2 and {H,A,B} ⊆ E3. The
premises (and conclusions) of arguments in each extension correspond to the maximal
consistent subsets of B (and their consequences). Hence, for example, (∆, α) ∈ E3 iff
α ∈ Cn({a, b}).
ASPIC+ [43] studies extensions of AFs consisting of arguments, and defeats ob-
tained from attacks and a preference relation. It is then shown in [43] that [15]’s con-
sistency and closure postulates are satisfied only if preferences are used to compare the
attacker and the targeted elementary argument (premise).
Definition 9. [Defeats] Let (A, C) be an AF where A and C are the arguments and
undermine attacks defined by B, and ≺⊆ A×A a strict partial ordering.
Let (Y,X) ∈ C, where Y undermine attacks X on ψ (i.e., on X ′ = ({ψ}, ψ)). Then
(Y,X) ∈ D (Y defeats X) if Y ⊀ X ′.
[43] studies specific preference relations. For example, given a partial ordering ≤ over
B (with < and ≈ defined in the usual way), then the ‘Elitist’ preference is defined as:
(Γ, φ) ≺E (∆, θ) iff ∃α ∈ Γ such that ∀β ∈ ∆, α < β (Elitist Preference)
Example 2. Referring to Figure 1, suppose ¬a ∨ ¬b < a ≈ b. Then F ≺E A,
G ≺E B, and so F does not defeat A, or H or G (on A), and G does not defeat B, or
H or F (on B). We obtain the AF with defeats in Figure 1ii). This AF ’s single stable
and preferred extension contains A,B,H . Suppose instead ¬a ∨ ¬b < a. Then only
F ≺E A. Now G’s attacks on B, H and F succeed as defeats (Figure 1iii)), and we
have two stable and preferred extensions; one containing A,B and H , the other A,C
and G.
[4, 43, 57] show that one can obtain an argumentation-based characterisation of non-
monotonic inference defined by Brewka’s Preferred Subtheories [13]. The latter starts
with a a totally ordered B partitioned into equivalence classes (B1, . . . ,Bn) such that
∀α ∈ Bi,∀β ∈ Bj , i < j iff β < α. A ‘preferred subtheory’ (ps) is obtained by
taking a maximal (under set inclusion) consistent subset of B1, maximally extended
with a subset of B2, and so on. Multiple ps may be constructed, and [43] shows that
with undermine attacks defined over the arguments A defined by B, and the defeats D
obtained using the Elitist preference, then each ps corresponds to the premises of argu-
ments in a stable extension of (A,D). Hence, α is classically entailed from a ps iff α is
the conclusion of an argument in a stable extension. Then α is a sceptical (credulous)
ps-inference iff α is entailed by all (respectively at least one) ps, iff α is a sceptical
(credulous) argumentation defined inference (i.e., α is the conclusion of an argument
in all, respectively at least one, stable extension(s)). Preferences over arguments can of
course be defined by criteria other than the Elitist comparison, and neither are prefer-
ences necessarily based on an ordering over B. For example, preferences may be based
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on the relative importance of values promoted [9], or the goals realised [51], by actions
whose justifying rationales are encoded in the arguments. Hence inference relations
other than those corresponding to Preferred Subtheories can be defined by classical
logic instantiations of AFs with preferences.
2.2. Rationality Postulates for Argumentation
The consistency and closure postulates [15] identify rational properties that one
would want to hold of the complete (and hence grounded, preferred and stable) exten-
sions of an instantiated AF . ASPIC [15] also identified sufficient conditions on logical
instantiations which ensure satisfaction of these postulates. ASPIC+ [43] then identi-
fied conditions for a broader range of instantiations while additionally accounting for
the use of preferences. We now review these postulates as they apply to classical logic
argumentation (sufficient conditions for satisfying these postulates will be reviewed in
Section 3.2). Note that we will use the notation conc(E) to denote the set of conclu-
sions of arguments in an extension E.
Recall that ASPIC and ASPIC+ are general frameworks for defining instantiations
of AF s. They assume an arbitrary language, and arguments are built from premises
and (strict/defeasible) inference rules. An argument X is a tree whose root node is
the argument’s conclusion, the leaves are its premises, and any non-leaf node is the
consequent φ of an inference rule r where φ′ is a child node of φ iff φ′ is a formula
in the antecedent of r. Sub-arguments of X are identified as sub-trees of X , and the
sub-argument closure postulate states that if X is in a complete extension E then all
sub-arguments of X are in E. The standard representation of classical logic arguments
consists only of premises paired with the entailed conclusion, and so a classical logic
argument in ASPIC+ applies a single strict inference rule to a set of premises (as de-
scribed in Section 2.1), yielding a tree whose root node – the argument’s conclusion –
has child leaf nodes that are the premises. Thus, the sub-trees are simply the premises
in the leaf nodes, and the sub-arguments are the elementary arguments associated with
premises. Hence for Cl-Arg2:
– Closure under sub-arguments amounts to stating that (in the remainder of this section
we assume complete extensions E,E′ . . .):
Let X = (∆, φ) ∈ E. If α ∈ ∆ then ({α}, α) ∈ E
– Closure under strict rules states that if a strict rule with consequent φ can be applied
to the conclusions of arguments in a complete extension, then there is an argument in
that extension that concludes φ. For Cl-Arg:
If conc(E) `c φ, then φ ∈ conc(E)
– Direct and indirect consistency respectively state that the conclusions of arguments
in a complete extension, and their closure under strict rules, do not conflict:
2This rendition of the postulate for classical logic argumentation is due to the ‘schematic’ representation
of classical logic arguments as premises paired with a conclusion. As we suggest later, arguments ‘proper’
should include the proof theoretic means whereby one entails the conclusion from the premises, in which
case the postulate would then require that all subproofs of a proof be included in a complete extension.
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∀α, β ∈ conc(E) : α 6= β and ∀α, β ∈ Cn(conc(E)) : α 6= β
Clearly, closure under strict rules and direct consistency imply indirect consistency.
More recently, two further rationality postulates were proposed for instantiations of
AF s based on propositional languages [16]. We introduce notation that (together with
Definition 4) allows us to generalise these postulates to first order instantiations. This
generalization can be seen as a modest contribution to the specification of rationality
postulates for logic-based argumentation.
Notation 3. Let Sy denote a set of symbols (recall Definition 4)3. Then B|Sy = {α ∈
B|symbols({α}) ⊆ Sy}, e.g., {¬a ∨ ¬b, c ∧ a}|{a,b} = {¬a ∨ ¬b} and {∀xP (x) →
Q(x),∃zP (z)∧R(z)}|{P,Q} = {∀xP (x)→ Q(x)}. Also, B‖B′ denotes that symbols(B)
∩ symbols(B′) = ∅, and B and B′ are said to be syntactically disjoint. Hence two sets
of first order formulae are syntactically disjoint if they share no predicate or function
(including constant) symbols (in the propositional case this equates to no shared propo-
sitional atomic formulae).
– Non-interference states that for any B composed of two independent (i.e., syntacti-
cally disjoint) bases B1 and B2, neither should ‘influence’ each other’s argumentation
defined inferences. That is to say, given frameworks AF and AF ′ instantiated respec-
tively by B1 and B1 ∪ B2, where B1‖B2, then:
E is an extension of AF iff there is an extension E′ of AF ′, where:
conc(E)|symbols(B1) = conc(E
′)|symbols(B1)
– Crash resistance states that there is no ‘contaminating’ B1 that when merged with
an unrelated B2, makes the latter irrelevant. That is to say, given frameworks AF and
AF ′ instantiated respectively by B1 and B1 ∪ B2, where B1‖B2, then:
{conc(E)|E is an extension of AF} 6= {conc(E)|E is an extension of
AF ′}
3. Dialectical Classical Logic Argumentation
In this section we propose practical desiderata for applications of logical instantia-
tions of Dung’s theory. We also discuss why features of standard approaches to Cl-Arg
preclude satisfaction of these desiderata, while at the same time being proposed as
sufficient conditions for satisfaction of the rationality postulates. We then formalise a
provably rational account of Cl-Arg that satisfies practical desiderata.
3.1. Applications and Practical Desiderata
Section 2.1 reviewed the definition of argumentation-based inference relations over
logical (in particular classical logic) bases instantiatingAF s. Formalisations of ‘instan-
tiated argumentation’ have thus been widely advocated for individual agent reasoning
3In [16], the term ‘atoms’ is used instead of symbols. We use the term symbols as we generalise to the
first order case.
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over uncertain and conflicting beliefs (e.g., [15, 39]) and decision making in which
practical arguments for alternative actions attack each other. In the latter case prefer-
ences may be based on the prioritisation of agent goals or the values promoted by ac-
tions, and are used to arbitrate amongst these practical arguments (e.g., [3, 8, 39, 51]).
Argumentation’s dialectical characterisation of non-monotonic inference provides
for generalisation of the above ‘monological’ applications to dialogues involving both
computational and human agents. Argumentation-based dialogues enable distributed
reasoning amongst agents communicating to persuade one another of the truth of a
proposition, decide amongst alternative action options, or negotiate allocations of re-
sources (e.g., [2, 38, 45, 48, 58]). Agents submit locutions consisting of arguments and
counter-arguments, as well as locutions that implicitly define arguments (e.g., when
an agent asserts a claim, and subsequently asserts supporting reasons in response to
another agent challenging the claim). The contents of locutions are incrementally in-
cluded in a public commitment store Bp [60], and agents can submit arguments con-
structed from their private distinct bases and Bp. At any point in the dialogue, an agent
can be said to ‘win the dialogue’ – i.e., successfully establish the dialogue ‘topic’ α
which may be a belief or decision option – by countering arguments moved by his
interlocutor, effectively showing (under the assumption of ‘logically perfect’ play, as
discussed in the example below) that an argument X claiming α is in an admissible
extension E of the AF instantiated by Bp [31, 48]. These dialogues can be seen as
generalising argument game proof theories (e.g. [42]) for monological applications in
which an agent shows that a given argument X is justified by successfully countering
defeating arguments that the agent can construct from his base (in this case the base,
and hence instantiated AF , is assumed fixed rather than being incrementally updated).
As in these argument games, dialogue rules regulating legal moves can then be varied
to establish that the admissibleE is a subset of an extension under different semantics.4
Example 4. Consider Example 1. Suppose Ag1 submits A constructed from its own
base B1. A is countered by Ag2 submitting F , constructed from her base B2. At this
point Ag2 is winning the dialogue. However note that A is in an admissible extension
of the AF instantiated by the committed premises a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b. The agents have not
played in a ‘logically perfect’ way [48]: Ag1 can construct and submit G.5
Another key reason for the impact of Dung’s theory is that evaluation of justified
arguments is essentially based on the intuitive and familiar ‘reinstatement principle’
whereby an argument is defended if all its defeaters are themselves defeated. The the-
ory’s compatibility with human modes of reasoning and debate has prompted empirical
studies of human uses of the reinstatement principle [52], and development of theories
and applications supporting both computational and human reasoning and dialogue
[44]. For example, computational models of dialogue for normatively guiding human-
4In [42], variations in rules yield games for membership under grounded, preferred and stable semantics,
and a game is proposed for showing sceptical justification under preferred semantics.
5Whether Ag2 is declared the winner depends on the context in which the dialogue model is deployed.
One might argue that the onus is on Ag1 to use Ag2’s premise ¬a ∨ ¬b to construct G and counter F .
Alternatively, a ‘dialogue manager’ [58] might be deployed to prompt the agents to submit arguments that
can be constructed, so ensuring (and possibly enforcing) logically perfect play.
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human [58] and human-computer [37] dialogue. Hence, real-world modes of dialecti-
cal reasoning have been formalised6, often drawing on insights from philosophical and
informal logic. For example, the notion of an ‘audience’ [46] to whom an argument is
addressed, has been modelled in extensions to Dung’s theory [10] and in making clas-
sical logic arguments more believable [35]. Dung’s theory has also been extended to
accommodate other real-world uses of argument, such as arguments supporting argu-
ments (see [40] for a review) and the weighing up of arguments for and against claims
(accrual) [41, 49]. The above monological and dialogical applications involving com-
putational and/or human agents, warrant consideration of two key practical desiderata
for formalisations of argumentation:
1. One needs to account for the fact that real-world computational and human
agents are resource-bounded.
2. Formalisations should be compatible with real-world modes of dialectical rea-
soning.
We now review the extent to which standard features of Cl-Arg preclude satisfaction of
these practical desiderata.
3.2. Practicality versus Rationality
Both [1], [33], and ASPIC+’s formalisation of Cl-Arg with preferences [43], as-
sume instantiation of an AF by all arguments defined by a base B (which will in
general be infinite)7. This is clearly unfeasible for agents with limited resources, given
the undecidability of first order classical logic, and that even in the propositional case,
deciding whether ∆ `c α is in general NP-hard, and therefore most likely intractable.
Moreover, for each argument constructed, one must not only check consistency of the
premises but also that they are subset-minimal; a problem in the second level of the
polynomial hierarchy [30], so that in the worst case, for every constructed argument
(∆, α) one needs to verify that ∀∆′ ⊂ ∆, ∆′ 0c α. Hence, to accommodate uses by
resource-bounded agents, one needs to study the outcomes of argument evaluation as-
suming AF s that may include only a subset of the arguments defined by a base (which
henceforth we refer to as partially instantiated AF s) and avoid enforcing checks on
the legitimacy of arguments before inclusion in an AF .
Standard formalisations of Cl-Arg are also incompatible with real-world modes of
dialectical reasoning. Firstly, in both monological and dialogical applications in which
an agent attempts to establish whether an argument X is justified, agents may simply
not construct all arguments defined by a base (be it an individual agent’s base or one
incrementally constructed by the dialogue). Agents pragmatically operate on the basis
6See the series of workshops www.cmna.info/CMNA14.
7In fact, although not considered in these works, it would suffice (under the assumption that undermine
attacks are used) to consider a possibly finite sub-framework AF ′ of an infinite AF , such that for each α
in a base B one includes the corresponding elementary argument and constructs and includes in AF ′ all
arguments that claim α. Then the justified elementary arguments in AF ′ will fully determine the status of
any argument X = (∆, γ) defined by B in the infinite AF ; if ∀α ∈ ∆, ({α}, α) is justified, then (∆, γ)
is justified. However, this would still be unfeasible for bases of any significant size, and more so given the
required checks on the legitimacy of arguments.
11
of beliefs or chosen actions that are provisionally acceptable, until later seeking further
counter-arguments from a given base, or from a base that is subsequently augmented
with newly acquired information. Moreover, it may not be necessary to construct all
arguments, given that in argument game proof theories and dialogues, it may suffice to
show membership ofX in an admissible extension (and hence an extension under other
semantics depending on the rules regulating legal moves). In other words, in practice
agents are not logically perfect for pragmatic reasons other than that they are resource
limited, further testifying to the need for studying partially instantiated AF s.
Secondly, establishing whether an individual argument’s premises are consistent, is
a special case of establishing the mutual consistency of a set of arguments’ premises,
and this is addressed dialectically in real-world dialogues. For example, an often used
dialectical move illustrated in the Socratic Elenchus [59] involves showing that an op-
ponent’s arguments collectively make use of inconsistent premises, by constructing an
argument from these premises to show that the opponent contradicts himself.
Thirdly, accounts of Cl-Arg typically make no reference to specific proof theo-
ries for constructing arguments, and so the subset minimality check is imposed as a
somewhat blunt instrument for ensuring that no premises are redundant with respect
to deriving the argument’s conclusion8. However, in practice agents do not interrogate
premises for subset minimality. Rather, the exclusion of trivially redundant premises
is determined by the proof theoretic means used to derive the conclusion from the
premises.
Fourthly, the exclusive targeting of premises by defeating arguments leads to the so
called ‘foreign commitment’ problem in dialogues. Agents may be forced to commit to
the truth of interlocutors’ premises for which they have insufficient reasons to believe
(see [17] for a concrete example of this problem), and may be subsequently obligated
to defend [60]. Consider Example 4. After A is attacked by F , Ag1 cannot counter
with A, as attacks cannot target conclusions of arguments. Ag1 has to counter F with
either G or H , and so commit to Ag2’s premise ¬a ∨ ¬b, respectively b. Suppose then
that another agent Ag3 were to attack Ag1’s argument H on B, requiring that Ag1 now
defend Ag2’s argument B.
We have argued that standard features of Cl-Arg preclude its suitability for use
by real-world resource-bounded agents. However, dispensing with these features may
result in violation of the rationality postulates. Dropping the consistency check on
premises may lead to violation of non-interference and crash-resistance. Consider the
syntactically disjoint B1 = {s} and B2 = {p,¬p}. Assuming all attacks succeed as
defeats, then ({s}, s) is in the grounded extension of the AF based on B1. However ∅
is the grounded extension of the AF ′ based on B1 ∪ B2, since in AF ′ every argument
is defeated by arguments ({p,¬p}, φ) (φ ∈ L)9, and it is well known that the grounded
extension is empty if there are no un-defeated arguments. Hence non-interference is
8This can be contrasted with the weaker condition that all premises are ‘used’ (as opposed to necessary)
to obtain the conclusion. There may well be inferences from non subset minimal sets of premises in which
all premises are used, e.g., three applications of modus ponens deriving q from p, p → r, p → q, r →
((p→ q)→ q).
9In particular ({s}, s) is defeated by an argument ({p,¬p},¬s) that concludes a conclusion syntacti-
cally disjoint from the premises via the explosivity of the inconsistent premises.
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violated. Moreover, B2 is contaminating as the grounded extension of the framework
based on B2 is ∅, and for any B1 (e.g., B1 = {s}) ∅ is the grounded extension of
the AF ′ based on B1 ∪ B2. Hence crash resistance is violated. Thus, arguments with
inconsistent premises are said to be contaminating as they may attack arguments with
syntactically unrelated premises.
As for the subset minimality check, we show in Section 3.7 that allowing non-
subset minimal arguments may also result in violation of non-interference. That this
is the case is suggested by a result shown for ASPIC+’s formulation of Cl-Arg [43].
The authors show that if one were to allow non-subset minimal arguments, then the
argumentation defined inferences remain unchanged only if one assumes preference
relations that do not strengthen subset minimal arguments by adding premises. That
is to say, if A is subset minimal and a non subset minimal A′ is obtained by adding
premises to the support of A, then A ≺ B implies A′ ≺ B. (Intuitively, one would
not want the strength of an argument to depend on premises that are redundantly used
in deriving the conclusion). Indeed, by definition, the Elitist preference (see Section 2)
satisfies this property. Thus one can dispense with subset minimality checks. But for
preference relations that do not satisfy this property (e.g., the Democratic preference
relation studied in [43]), one needs to identify subset minimal arguments and impose
this constraint on the preference relation. However this would not be necessary if one
can identify a notion of non-redundancy enforceable by proof theories for constructing
arguments, and such that the proof theoretic exclusion of arguments that use redun-
dant premises suffices to ensure satisfaction of non-interference and crash resistance
independently of the preference relation used. (We revisit this issue in Section 4).
The rationality postulates are shown to hold [15, 43] under the assumption that all
arguments defined by a base are included in an AF . Consider the following example
uses of argumentation. Suppose that in attempting to defend an argument, an agent
constructs arguments P = ({p, p → ¬q},¬q) and Q = ({p, p → q}, q). To ensure
that no complete extension E can include P and Q and so violate direct consistency
(i.e., that no such irrational defense is possible), one needs to assume that the AF , by
virtue of including all defined arguments, includes the arguments X,Y and Z, where:
• X = ({p, p→ q},¬(p→ ¬q)) attacks A = ({p→ ¬q}, p→ ¬q);
• Y = ({p, p→ ¬q},¬(p→ q)) attacks B = ({p→ q}, p→ q);
• Z = ({p→ q, p→ ¬q},¬p) attacks C = ({p}, p).
Then [43] shows that direct consistency is satisfied under the assumption that the
preference relation used is ‘reasonable’ ([43] shows that the Elitist preference relation
is reasonable), which in this example means that either X ⊀ A or Y ⊀ B or Z ⊀ C.
Now, suppose X ≺ A and Y ≺ B and ≺ is reasonable. Then it must be that Z ⊀ C.
This means that the agent cannot use P and Q in its attempted defense, since Z will
defeat both P and Q on C, and so to defend against Z, will mean including in its
attempted defense (i.e., E), some V ∈ E that defeats Z. But any such V must then
defeat P ∈ E or Q ∈ E, contradicting the admissibility of E.
However, if the agent does not construct all arguments then direct consistency may
be violated. For example, resources may not suffice to construct Z; indeed, in the
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resource bounded proof theory presented in Section 4, we show that construction of Z
assumes a higher bound on inferential capabilities than construction of X or Y .
Consider also a variation of the above example in which an agentAg1, in the course
of a persuasion dialogue with Ag2, submits arguments that make use of premises p,
p → q and p → ¬q (without as yet having constructed and submitted arguments P
and Q). Again, one must assume a reasonable preference relation and that Ag2 can
construct from these premises the arguments X , Y and Z, to prevent Ag1 winning the
dialogue by forcing Ag1 to move some V that defeats one of Ag1’s own arguments
(i.e., Ag2 effectively shows that Ag1 is indirectly inconsistent).
We therefore want that the consistency postulates are satisfied by partially instan-
tiated AF s. Moreover, one would intuitively expect that having explicitly recognised
the inconsistency of premises (e.g., p, p→ q, p→ ¬q) in an extension E, through con-
struction of arguments with conflicting conclusions (e.g., P,Q) then this should suffice
to ensure that E cannot be rationally accepted as a defendable set of arguments, with-
out needing to assume construction of the additional arguments X , Y and Z, or any
properties of preference relations10. Also note that the closure under strict rules pos-
tulate also assumes construction of all arguments defined by a base, and so assumes an
idealised notion of an agent that is clearly unrealistic in its assumption of logical om-
niscience [56]. We therefore later modify this closure postulate to account for partially
instantiated AF s.
Finally, suppose one were to avoid the foreign commitment problem by allowing
attacks on conclusions, as indicated by the dotted arrows in Figure 1. Then E′ =
{A,B,C} is now admissible and so a subset of a complete extension E. However
E cannot be closed (neither F , G or H can be in E since E would not then be conflict
free). Also E would be indirectly inconsistent.
We now formalise an account of Cl-Arg that drops the consistency and subset mini-
mality checks on arguments, formalises the dialectical demonstration that the premises
of an argument, or set of arguments, is inconsistent, and solves the foreign commitment
problem. We then show that despite dropping checks on the legitimacy of arguments,
and making only minimal assumptions as to the arguments included in a partially in-
stantiated AF , the closure (we will modify closure under strict rules to account for
partially instantiated frameworks) and consistency postulates are satisfied assuming
any preference relation over arguments. We also show that the non-interference and
contamination postulates, generalised here so as to apply to first order instantiations of
AF s, are satisfied under the assumption that preference relations are ‘coherent’.
3.3. Dialectical Frameworks and Acceptability
We begin by observing that interlocutors in dialogues typically distinguish their
own premises, namely those that they accept as true, from the premises that their oppo-
nent commits to and that they want to criticise: “on the basis of the premises I regard
to be true, and supposing for the sake of argument what you regard to be true, then
I can show some conclusion that contradicts one of your premises” or “I can show
10It should be obvious that in real-world argumentation, an agent recognises that he is committing to
inconsistent premises the moment he constructs arguments with conflicting conclusions.
14
that your premises are inconsistent”. This pattern is pervasive in real argumentation
practice11, and motivates a dialectical ‘ontology’ for classical logic arguments that ex-
plicitly differentiates between an argument’s assumptions that are premises regarded as
true, and those supposed true for the sake of argument (the argument’s suppositions).
We also drop the subset minimality and consistency checks. Hence, arguments with
inconsistent assumptions can now conclude uprise.
Definition 10. [Dialectical Arguments] X = (∆,Γ, α) is a dialectical argument de-
fined by a base B, if (∆ ∪ Γ) ⊆ B, ∆ ∩ Γ = ∅, and ∆ ∪ Γ `c α.
If α = uprise then X is said to be a falsum argument. If Γ = ∅ then X is said to be un-
conditional; else X is conditional. Finally, if ∆ = ∅ then X is said to be unassailable
(since X cannot then be attacked).
Notation 5. Let X = (∆,Γ, α) be a dialectical argument, S a set of dialectical argu-
ments.
• ∆, Γ and α are, respectively,X’s premises, suppositions and conclusion, denoted
prem(X), suppositions(X) and conclusion(X). Also, assumptions(X) denotes
prem(X) ∪ suppositions(X).
• Generalising the above notation to sets of arguments in the obvious way: prem(S) =⋃
X∈S prem(X); suppositions(S) =
⋃
X∈S suppositions(X); assumptions(S) =
prem(S) ∪ suppositions(S); conclusion(S) = ⋃X∈S conclusion(X).
Example 6. The dialectical arguments A defined by B = {a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b} include:
A1 = ({a},∅, a) B1 = ({b},∅, b) C1 = ({¬a ∨ ¬b},∅,¬a ∨ ¬b)
F1 = ({b,¬a ∨ ¬b},∅,¬a) G1 = ({a,¬a ∨ ¬b},∅,¬b) H1 = ({a, b},∅,¬(¬a ∨ ¬b))
F2 = ({b}, {¬a ∨ ¬b},¬a) G2 = ({a}, {¬a ∨ ¬b},¬b) H2 = ({a}, {b},¬(¬a ∨ ¬b))
X1 = (∅, {a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b},uprise) X2 = ({a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b},∅, c) X3 = ({b,¬a ∨ ¬b}, {a},uprise)
X4 = ({a}, {b,¬a ∨ ¬b},uprise) Z1 = ({a, b,¬a ∨ ¬b},∅,¬a) Z2 = ({b,¬a ∨ ¬b}, {a},¬a)
As in [43], we interpret an attack between two arguments as declaratively denot-
ing that the conclusion of the attacking argument conflicts with some element in the
attacked argument. In particular, we here formalise undermine attacks, denoting that
the conclusion of the attacking argument conflicts with an assumption in the attacked
argument that is a premise regarded as true. Preferences are then applied to determine
the defeat relation, which is interpreted dialectically, in that it denotes the use of the de-
feating argument as a counter-argument to the defeated argument. We will then utilise
the distinction between premises and suppositions when accounting for the dialecti-
cal use of defeats in determining the acceptability of arguments. Intuitively, when an
agent constructs a candidate set of admissible arguments S, the agent commits to the
11For example, in his Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences [32], Galileo presents a famous refutation
of Aristotle’s theory of falling bodies, in the form of a dialogue between their respective alter-egos Salviati
and Simplicio. Salviati demonstrates that the premises of Simplicio’s arguments justifying that heavier
bodies fall faster than lighter bodies, lead to a contradiction (i.e., are inconsistent).
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premises of arguments in S. Any of these premises can then be supposed true when
challenging the acceptability of some Y w.r.t. S. That is to say, when moving some
X as a defeat on Y , X’s suppositions can include premises of any arguments in S. In
turn, when defending Y by some Z ∈ S that defeats X , Z’s suppositions can include
any of X’s premises. In the latter case, Z supposes for the sake of argument only
X’s premises, since in order to invalidate the admissibility of S, it suffices that only
one such defeat by some X on Y ∈ S be undefended (rather than having to construct
some candidate set of arguments S′ that includes X). Note that a defeat by a falsum
argument X = (∆,Γ,uprise) on Y indicates that under the assumption that ∆ is true, the
supposed premises Γ in S are inconsistent, and Y in particular is targeted since at least
one of the in Γ is also a premise of Y .
Definition 11. [Attacks] Let A be a set of dialectical arguments defined by B. The
attack relation C ⊆ A × A is defined as follows. For any X = (∆,Γ, α), Y =
(Π,Σ, β) ∈ A: (X,Y ) ∈ C (which we may denote by writing X → Y ) iff exactly one
of the following holds:
• α 6= uprise and α ∈ Π (we say that X attacks Y on α, equivalently on Y ′ =
({α},∅, α));
• α = uprise and Γ∩Π 6= ∅ (we say that X attacks Y on any φ ∈ Γ∩Π, equivalently
on any Y ′ = ({φ},∅, φ)).
Notice that Definition 11 adapts the notion of an undermine attack (Definition 7) in the
sense that the premises of an attacked argument are targeted by the attacking argument.
We thus also adapt the term ‘elementary argument’ (Definition 8) to refer to Y ′ =
({α},∅, α) in the above definition, and say that X is equivalently said to attack Y on
Y ′ (recall the comment after Definition 8).
Notice that by definition, no argument in any set S can be attacked with uncon-
ditional falsum arguments (∆,∅,uprise). Indeed, it would be insensible to allow such
attacks, since an agent would be irrationally attacking with an argument that she her-
self recognises as based on inconsistent premises12.
We now define the defeat relation. Firstly, recall that the distinction between ∆ and
Γ in X = (∆,Γ, φ) is an epistemic distinction between assumptions one commits to
as being true and supposed true for the sake of argument. Logically, X is equivalent
to any X ′ = (∆′,Γ′, φ) where ∆′ ∪ Γ′ = ∆ ∪ Γ. Hence G1 and G2 in Example 6
are logically equivalent. We consider the strength (and hence relative preference) of an
argument to be independent of whether assumptions are regarded as true or supposed
true. To illustrate, suppose the Elitist preference relation (Section 2.1) defined on the
basis of the well known temporal ordering over rules in the legal domain, such that
later rules override earlier rules [50]. Suppose such an ordering on conflicting legal
rules: a → b < a → ¬b, so that X = ({a, a → b},∅,¬(a → ¬b)) does not defeat
Y = ({a → ¬b},∅, a → ¬b) since X ≺E Y . In dialogical applications, the only
12Note that allowing such attacks would not pose theoretical problems, since (∆,∅,uprise) would be counter-
attacked by (∅,∆,uprise) which by virtue of having empty premises (and so being un-attackable) would be
acceptable w.r.t. any set E.
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distinction between X and X ′ = ({a}, {a → b},¬(a → ¬b)) is that in X ′ a → b
is a premise that an interlocutor commits to. (Clearly, no such distinction arises in
monological applications). Thus, one still uses the temporal ordering to conclude that
X ′ ≺E Y ; the fact that a → b is a premise used by an interlocutor is irrelevant to
defining the temporal based preference. Henceforth, we therefore assume preferences
over arguments are invariant modulo logical equivalence:
Definition 12. [Logically Equivalent Arguments] LetA be the dialectical arguments
defined by B and ≺ a strict partial ordering over A. Let X = (∆,Γ, α) ∈ A. Then:
• [X] = {X ′ = (∆′,Γ′, α)|∆′ ∪ Γ′ = ∆ ∪ Γ}.
∀Y,Z ∈ [X] we say that Y and Z are logically equivalent.
• ≺ is said to be invariant modulo logical equivalence (imle) if ∀Y ′ ∈ [Y ], ∀X ′ ∈
[X] : Y ≺ X iff Y ′ ≺ X ′.
In the case that X = (∅,Γ,uprise) attacks Y , the attack dialectically demonstrates that the
proponent of Y commits to the inconsistent premises Γ, either because Γ ⊆ prem(Y ),
or Γ ⊆ prem(Y )∪prem(E) when challenging the acceptability of Y w.r.t. E. It would
clearly be incoherent to use preferences to reject such an attack.
Definition 13. [Defeats] Let A be a set of dialectical arguments, C the attack relation,
and ≺ a strict partial ordering, over A. Then ∀(X,Y ) ∈ C, (X,Y ) ∈ D (X defeats Y )
iff exactly one of the following holds:
• X is an argument of the form (∅,Γ,uprise)13;
• ∃α ∈ prem(X) s.t. Y → X on α, and Y ⊀ ({α},∅, α).
We may write Y ⇒ X to denote (Y,X) ∈ D, and Y ; X to denote (Y,X) /∈ D.
Recall that we are interested in AF s that do not necessarily include all arguments
defined by a base. Hence, we define the notion of a dialectical AF that includes any
subset of the arguments defined by a base. We will then identify (in this section and
in Section 3.7) sufficient conditions on the arguments that must be included in order to
ensure satisfaction of the rationality postulates.
Definition 14. [Dialectical AF instantiated by a base] LetA be any subset of the set
of dialectical arguments defined by a base B, and D the defeat relation defined by the
attack relation C, and a strict partial ordering ≺ over A. Then (A,D) is a dialectical
AF defined by B and ≺.
Recall that the suppositions of an argumentX can suppose for the sake of argument
the premises of arguments in S when challenging the acceptability of some Y w.r.t. S.
Then Z ∈ S can suppose the premises of X when defeating X in order to defend Y .
13We later consider ‘coherent’ preference relations s.t. ∀α ∈ Γ it cannot be that (∅,Γ,uprise) ≺ ({α},∅, α).
Then, even if we don’t impose that attacks from such arguments always succeed as defeats, coherent prefer-
ence relations guarantee that such attacks always succeed as a defeat on at least one premise in Γ.
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Definition 15. [Dung Semantics for dialecticalAF s] Let (A,D) be a dialecticalAF ,
and S ⊆ A, X,Y ∈ A. Then:
• X defeats Y with respect to S, denoted X ⇒S Y , if (X,Y ) ∈ D and
suppositions(X) ⊆ prem(S ∪ {Y }).
• S is conflict free if ∀Z, Y ∈ S, Z ;S Y .
• Y is acceptable w.r.t. S if ∀X s.t. X ⇒S Y 14, ∃Z ∈ S s.t. Z ⇒{X} X .
• Let S be conflict free. Then S is: an admissible extension iff X ∈ S implies X
is acceptable w.r.t. S; a complete extension iff S is admissible and ifX is accept-
able w.r.t. S then X ∈ S; a preferred extension iff it is a set inclusion maximal
complete extension; the grounded extension iff it is the set inclusion minimal
complete extension; a stable extension iff ∀Y /∈ S, ∃X ∈ S s.t. X ⇒{Y } Y .
• For T ∈ {complete, preferred, grounded, stable}, X is sceptically, respectively
credulously justified under the T semantics if X belongs to all, respectively at
least one, T extension.
• F(A,D)(S) = {X|X is acceptable w.r.t. S}.
Notice that every stable extension of a dialectical AF is a preferred (and hence com-
plete) extension. This result is shown in exactly the same way as for Dung AF s15.
In Section 2.1, the argumentation defined inferences are obtained by detaching the
conclusions of arguments in extensions. However, the extensions of dialectical AF s
may contain conditional arguments that suppose the truth of assumptions when used
dialectically. Once the extensions are defined, we detach only the conclusions (which
we call ‘claims’) of unconditional arguments all of whose assumptions are premises
presumed true.
Definition 16. [Conclusions (‘claims’) of an Extension] Let E be an extension of a
dialectical AF . Then claims(E) = {φ|(∆,∅, φ) ∈ E}.
The dialectical ontology for arguments solves the foreign commitment problem de-
scribed in Section 3.2. Recall that Ag1 submits A and Ag2 counters with F . Then to
defend A, Ag1 must defeat F with either G or H , respectively committing to Ag2’s
premise b or ¬a ∨ ¬b in Ag2’s argument F . Now suppose the following continuation
of Example 6.
14Of course, in practice, when submitting a defeating argumentX , one need only reference the set S′ ⊆ S
such that S′ are the arguments in S whose premises are referenced by suppositions(X).
15Suppose E is stable, X ∈ E and Y ⇒E X . If Y ∈ E then this contradicts E is conflict free. If
Y /∈ E, then Z ∈ E, Z ⇒{Y } Y , and so X is acceptable w.r.t. E. Moreover, if X /∈ E, then X cannot
be acceptable w.r.t. E since ∃Y ∈ E s.t. Y ⇒{X} X . Hence if X were acceptable w.r.t. E then Z ∈ E,
Z ⇒{Y } Y and so Z ⇒E Y , contradicting E is conflict free. Hence E is complete and must be maximal
complete (i.e., preferred) since any E′ ⊃ E cannot be conflict free.
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A1= ({a},∅,a) G2= ({a},{¬a∨¬b},¬b) H2= ({a},{b},¬(¬a∨¬b))E X1= (∅,{a,b,¬a∨¬b},∧)
X 3 = ({b,¬a∨¬b},{a},∧)Z 2 = ({b,¬a∨¬b},{a},¬a)Z1= ({a,b,¬a∨¬b},∅,¬a)F1= ({b,¬a∨¬b},∅,¬a)
≺
≺
Figure 2: All arguments outside ofE defeatA1,G2 andH2. H2 defeats all arguments outside ofE. Hence
E is admissible.
Example 7. ConsiderE in Figure 2. Suppose ∀V ∈ {F1, Z1, Z2, X3}, V ⊀ A1. Then
for each V we have that V ⇒E A1, and V ⇒E G2 on A1, V ⇒E H2 on A1. Suppose
also that G1 ≺ B1, H1 ⊀ C1, and since ≺ is imle, G2 ≺ B1 and H2 ⊀ C1. Hence
∀V ∈ {F1, X3, Z1, Z2}, G2 ;{V } V and H2 ⇒{V } V (on C1).
E is admissible, despite Ag1 not having to commit to either ¬a ∨ ¬b or b as
premises, since G2 and H2 respectively include ¬a ∨ ¬b and b as suppositions. H2
defends against each of V ’s defeats on members of E (where H2’s assumption b is
only supposed true for the sake of argument).
Remark 8. Suppose a dialectical AF containing exactly the arguments in Example
6. No admissible extension E can contain the arguments X2 and Z1, both of whose
premises are inconsistent, since X1 ⇒E X2 (X1 ⇒E Z1), and the unassailable X1
cannot be defeated by virtue of its premises being empty. Hence X2 (Z1) cannot be
defended and so cannot be acceptable w.r.t. E. Moreover, no admissible (and not just
complete) extension E can contain arguments with conflicting conclusions. Suppose
E contains A1 and F1. But then X1 ⇒E A1 on A1, and X1 ⇒E F1 on both B1
and C1, indicating that the proponent of arguments in E has committed to inconsistent
premises. No argument in E can defend against X1, and so E cannot be admissible.
In contrast with Example 1, which assumes the standard ontology for arguments, Re-
mark 8 highlights that one does not require that all arguments (i.e., G1 and H1) can
be constructed in order to guarantee satisfaction of the direct consistency postulate. It
suffices that the assumptions of arguments with conflicting conclusions (i.e., A1 and
F1) be combined to yield a falsum argument (i.e., X1), which we argue is a less de-
manding, and indeed more intuitive assumption as to the arguments that an agent can
construct.
In general, if the inconsistency of a set of premises is recognised by construct-
ing at least two arguments from these premises with conflicting conclusions, then this
guarantees consistency of extensions under the assumption that one combines their as-
sumptions to yield an argument concludinguprise. Of course, if either of the two arguments
is constructed from inconsistent premises, and this is recognisable through construc-
tion of an argument from those premises that concludes uprise, then it is not necessary to
assume that one combines their assumptions. This points to properties of any set A of
arguments in a dialectical AF that suffice to ensure satisfaction of the consistency and
closure postulates:
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Definition 17. [Properties of sets of arguments in dialectical AF s] Let (A,D) be a
dialectical AF . We define properties that A may satisfy:
(P1) ∀X ∈ A: α ∈ prem(X) implies ({α},∅, α) ∈ A.
(P2) ∀X ∈ A: X ′ ∈ [X] implies X ′ ∈ A.
(P3) If (∆,∅, α) ∈ A and (Γ,∅, α) ∈ A, then either (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A or (Γ,∅,uprise) ∈
A or (∆ ∪ Γ,∅,uprise) ∈ A.
We believe that requiring that A satisfies P1, P2 and P3 would impose minimally re-
strictive assumptions as to the arguments that agents should be able to construct. P3 is
discussed above. P1 is a kind of reflexivity property, and states that for any premise α
of an argument in A, the corresponding ‘elementary’ argument ({α},∅, α) is also in
A. P2 says that if X ∈ A, then A contains all logically equivalent arguments that are
distinct only in the epistemic distinction between premises and suppositions. Note that
P2 does not imply use of additional resources in constructing arguments. Rather, given
a constructed argument (∆,Γ, α), the practical meaning of P2 is that any differential
labelling of the assumptions in ∆∪Γ is accessible to an agent when using the argument
dialectically. Of course there is a distinct issue with respect to the computational effort
required to list all logically equivalent arguments (which for each given argument are
exponential in the number of assumptions). However, we suggest that in practice this
will not be necessary. An interesting topic for future work would be to identify (given
an AF instantiated by dialectical arguments moved in monological and dialogical ap-
plications) the minimal set of logically equivalent arguments that need to be listed to
ensure satisfaction of the rationality postulates (e.g., given arguments (∆,Γ, α) and
(∆′,Γ′,¬α), it may suffice to list only (Γ ∪ Γ′,∆ ∪∆′,uprise)).
3.4. Closure and Consistency Postulates
We prove closure and consistency postulates for dialectical AF s that include any
subset of the arguments defined by a base, subject to the above assumptions P1–P3.
We first show the following lemmas:
Lemma 9. LetE be a complete extension of a dialecticalAF (A,D) whereA satisfies
P1. Then ∀X ∈ A such that prem(X) ⊆ prem(E), X ∈ E.
PROOF. By definition, a complete extension E is an admissible (and hence conflict
free) set such that all arguments acceptable w.r.t. E are in E. Hence we need to show
that X is acceptable w.r.t. E and E ∪ {X} is conflict free.
– Suppose Y ⇒E X on some X ′ = ({α},∅, α), Y = (∆,Γ, φ) (φ = uprise or φ = α)16.
Since prem(X) ⊆ prem(E), then Γ ⊆ prem(E). Since α ∈ prem(X) ⊆ prem(E),
∃X ′′ ∈ E s.t. Y ⇒E X ′′ on X ′. Since E is complete ∃Z ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y . Hence
X is acceptable w.r.t. E.
– Suppose for contradiction that E ∪ {X} is not conflict free. Then either:
1. Y ∈ E,Z ∈ E, Y 6= X,Z 6= X , and Y ⇒E∪{X} Z. Hence Y ⇒E Z, contradict-
ing E is complete and so conflict free.
16Henceforth we may simply write φ, leaving it to the reader to interpret φ as denoting uprise or α.
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2. Y ∈ E and Y ⇒E∪{X} X . Hence Y ⇒E X . Since X acceptable w.r.t. E,
∃Z ∈ E, Z ⇒{Y } Y . Hence Z ⇒E Y , contradicting E is complete and so conflict
free.
3. Y ∈ E and X ⇒E∪{X} Y . Hence X ⇒E Y . Since E is complete, ∃Z ∈ E,
Z ⇒{X} X . Hence Z ⇒E X . Since X is acceptable w.r.t. E, ∃W ∈ E, W ⇒{Z} Z
and so W ⇒E Z, contradicting E is complete and so conflict free.
4. X ⇒E∪{X} X . Hence X ⇒E X . Since X acceptable w.r.t. E, ∃Y ∈ E,
Y ⇒{X} X . Hence Y ⇒E X , and so ∃Z ∈ E, Z ⇒{Y } Y and Z ⇒E Y , contradict-
ing E is complete and so conflict free. QED
Recall that for Cl-Arg, the sub-argument postulate states that if X is in a complete
extension E then all the elementary arguments associated with its premises are in E.
Theorem 10. [Sub-argument Closure] Let E be a complete extension of a dialecti-
cal AF (A,D) such that A satisfies P1. Let X ∈ E. Then if α ∈ prem(X) then
({α},∅, α) ∈ E.
PROOF. By P1, X ′ = ({α},∅, α) ∈ A. Since X ∈ E, prem(X ′) ⊆ prem(E). By
Lemma 9, X ′ ∈ E. QED
Direct consistency (see Section 2.2) states that no arguments in a complete exten-
sion have conflicting conclusions. Since we allow arguments concluding uprise, we show
that claims(E) (recall that these are the conclusions of unconditional arguments that
make no suppositions for the sake of argument) neither contains uprise nor conflicting con-
clusions, for the more general case of admissible extensions.
Theorem 11. [Direct Consistency] Let E be an admissible extension of a dialectical
AF (A,D). If A satisfies P1, P2 and P3, then ∀α, β ∈ claims(E), α 6= uprise and β 6= α.
PROOF. Case 1: Suppose X = (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ E. By P2, X ′ = (∅,∆,uprise) ∈ A. X ′
attacks X on every α ∈ ∆. Recall (Def. 13) that since X ′ is an unassailable falsum
argument, every such attack succeeds as a defeat. Moreover, X ′ cannot be defeated,
contradicting X is acceptable w.r.t. E.
Case 2: X,Y ∈ E, X = (∆,∅, α), Y = (Γ,∅, α). If either X ′ = (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A or
Y ′ = (Γ,∅,uprise) ∈ A, then (given P2) either (∅,∆,uprise) ⇒E X or (∅,Γ,uprise) ⇒E Y ,
contradicting X (Y ) is acceptable w.r.t. E as in case 1). Else, by P3, Z = (∆ ∪
Γ,∅,uprise) ∈ A. By P2, Z ′ = (∅,∆ ∪ Γ,uprise) ∈ A. Since ∆ ∪ Γ ⊆ prem(E), Z ′ ⇒E X
(on all δ ∈ ∆) and Z ′ ⇒E Y (on all γ ∈ Γ). Since Z ′ is unassailable, this contradicts
X,Y acceptable w.r.t. E. QED
Satisfaction of direct consistency for admissible (and not just complete) extensions is
a desirable property for both monological and dialogical applications. As discussed in
Sections 3.1 (see also footnote 4) and 3.2, in both application types it often suffices that
an agent identify an admissible extension E containing the argument X whose status
is to be established. Clearly, agents do not then proceed to include all arguments that
can be defended by E so as to define a complete extension. Hence one would want
that direct consistency holds for admissible extensions. Of course, in real-world appli-
cations an agent may simply refrain from submitting any arguments with conflicting
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conclusions, whereas an agent may unwittingly commit to arguments whose premises
are mutually inconsistent (e.g., the example in Section 3.2 in which Ag1 commits to
premises p, p→ q and p→ ¬q, and the dialogue referred to in footnote 11). However,
no admissible E can contain arguments with premises whose inconsistency is recog-
nised by the construction (from those premises) of an argument concludinguprise, or a pair
of arguments with directly conflicting conclusions.
Theorem 12. [Premise Consistency] Let (A,D) be a dialectical AF such thatA sat-
isfies P2. If for some ∆ ⊆ prem(E) : (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A, then E cannot be an admissible
extension of (A,D).
PROOF. Suppose for contradiction that ∃∆ ⊆ prem(E) s.t. (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A, and E
is admissible. By P2, Z = (∅,∆,uprise) ∈ A, and so for all β ∈ ∆, ∃X ∈ E s.t.
β ∈ prem(X) and Z ⇒E X , contradicting E is admissible. QED
Note of course that under the assumption that P3 holds, a sufficient condition for satis-
faction of premise consistency would be that for some ∆,Γ ⊆ prem(E): ∃(∆,∅, α) ∈
A and ∃(Γ,∅,¬α) ∈ A.
We now adapt the closure under strict rules postulate to account for the fact that it
may be that not all arguments defined by a base are included in a dialectical AF . In
general, even though claims(E) `c α, it may not be that there exists an X ∈ E such
that X concludes α, given that agents are not logically omniscient and do not construct
all arguments from a base (e.g., because of insufficient resources). However, if α is
entailed by the claims of arguments E′ ⊆ E, and there is an argument X that, from the
premises in E′, concludes α, then X is in E.
Theorem 13. [Closure under Strict Rules for dialectical AF s] Let E be a complete
extension of (A,D), where A satisfies P1. Let E′ ⊆ E and claims(E)′ `c α. If there
exists an X = (∆,∅, α) ∈ A such that ∆ = prem(E′), then X ∈ E.
PROOF. Follows immediately from Lemma 9. QED
We have shown satisfaction of the consistency and (modified) closure postulates
under the assumption that agents only construct possibly finite subsets of the set of all
arguments defined by a base (provided the subsets satisfy P1, P2 and P3). Moreover,
unlike the ASPIC+ framework [43], the postulates have been shown to hold without
making any assumptions as to the properties of the preference relation used to de-
termine whether attacks succeed as defeats (recall that ASPIC+ assumes ‘reasonable’
preference relations that satisfy a number of properties; see Section 3.2), and both con-
sistency of conclusions and premises is shown for admissible extensions.
3.5. The Fundamental Lemma and Monotonicity of the Characteristic Function
Two key properties of Dung AFs are the Fundamental Lemma (FL) [26, p. 7] – if
X and X ′ are acceptable w.r.t. an admissible E, then E ∪{X} is admissible and X ′ is
acceptable w.r.t. E ∪ {X} – and monotonicity of an AF ’s characteristic function [26,
p. 9]: E ⊆ E′ implies F(E) ⊆ F(E′). The FL implies that any admissible extension
is a subset of a preferred extension. Monotonicity of F allows one to show that F has
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a unique least fixed point that is the grounded extension, and that iterating F (starting
with ∅) yields the grounded extension.
Both these properties can straightforwardly be shown for Dung AF s, since when
determining the acceptability ofX w.r.t. E, the defeats onX are independent of the set
E under consideration. However for dialectical AF s, the defeats on X w.r.t. E may be
a subset of the defeats on X w.r.t. E′ ⊃ E (since the additional premises committed to
in E′ can now be suppositions in arguments that did not defeat X w.r.t. E). However,
these properties can be shown by focussing on sets of arguments that are ‘epistemically
maximal’. Intuitively, if X = (∆,Γ, α) ∈ E, and some supposition β ∈ Γ is also a
premise of an argument in E, then commitment to the truth of the premise β also
implies a commitment to the logically equivalent X ′ = (∆ ∪ {β},Γ \ {β}, α).
Definition 18. [Epistemically Maximal Sets] Let (A,D) be a dialectical AF . Then
E ⊆ A is epistemically maximal (em) iff:
If X = (∆,Γ, α) ∈ E, Γ′ ⊆ (Γ ∩ prem(E)), then X ′ = (∆ ∪ Γ′,Γ \ Γ′, α) ∈ E.
The function Clem : 2A 7→ 2A maps any E to its epistemically maximal set:
Clem(E) =E∪{X ′|X ∈ E,X ′ ∈ [X], prem(X) ⊆ prem(X ′), prem(X ′) ⊆ prem(E)}
We now show some straightforward results (note that when referring to the char-
acteristic function F(A,D) we will omit the subscript). Henceforth we assume that the
arguments A in a dialectical AF satisfy P1, P2 and P3 (Definition 17).
Lemma 14. Let (A,D) be a dialectical AF . Then ∀S ⊆ A: Clem(S) ⊆ A.
PROOF. The result follows immediately from P2, which states that if X ∈ A then all
arguments logically equivalent to X are in A. QED
Lemma 15. Let F be the characteristic function of (A,D), and E ⊆ A a fixed point
of F (i.e., E = F(E)). Then E is epistemically maximal.
PROOF. Suppose for contradiction that E is not em, hence ∃X ′ ∈ Clem(E) \E. Since
prem(X ′) ⊆ prem(E) and E is complete, X ′ ∈ E by Lemma 9. Contradiction. QED
Lemma 16. Let E′ = Clem(E), and ∀X ∈ E, X is acceptable w.r.t. E′. Then ∀Y ∈
E′ \ E, Y is acceptable w.r.t. E′.
PROOF. Suppose Y ∈ E′ \ E, Z ⇒E′ Y on α. Hence Z ⊀ ({α},∅, α). Since E′ =
Clem(E), then prem(E′) = prem(E), α ∈ prem(E), and so ∃X ∈ E, α ∈ prem(X),
and Z ⇒E′ X on α. By assumption of X acceptable w.r.t. E′, ∃Q ∈ E′, Q⇒{Z} Z.
Hence Y is acceptable w.r.t. E′. QED
3.5.1. Proving a variant of the Fundamental Lemma and implied properties
We now present results for use in proving a variant of the fundamental lemma.
Lemma 17. Let E ⊆ A such that every argument in E is acceptable w.r.t. E, and A
satisfies P1, P2 and P3. Then E is conflict free.
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PROOF. Suppose for contradiction that X,Y ∈ E, X ⇒E Y on α, where X =
(∆,Γ, φ), φ = uprise or φ = α.
1) Suppose φ = uprise. Then (by Definition 11) it must be that Γ 6= ∅. By P2, Z =
(∅,∆ ∪ Γ,uprise) ∈ A. Since ∆ ∪ Γ ⊆ prem(E), then ∀β ∈ ∆ ∪ Γ, ∃W ∈ E s.t.
Z ⇒E W on β, contradicting W is acceptable w.r.t. E.
2) Suppose φ = α. By P2, X ′ = (∆ ∪ Γ,∅, α) ∈ A. By P1 ({α},∅, α) ∈ A. By P3,
either:
• (∆ ∪ Γ,∅,uprise) ∈ A (in which case ∆ ∪ Γ 6= ∅) and ∆ ∪ Γ ⊆ prem(E), so that
∀β ∈ ∆ ∪ Γ, ∃W ∈ E s.t. (∅,∆ ∪ Γ,uprise)⇒E W on β, contradicting W is acceptable
w.r.t. E, or
• ({α},∅,uprise) ∈ A, and since α ∈ prem(E), (∅, {α},uprise) ⇒E Y on α, contradicting
Y is acceptable w.r.t. E, or
• (∆∪Γ∪{α},uprise) ∈ A. By P2, Z = (∅,∆∪Γ∪{α},uprise) ∈ A. Since ∆∪Γ∪{α} ⊆
prem(E), Z ⇒E Y on α and ∀β ∈ ∆∪Γ, ∃W ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒E W on β, contradicting
Y,W acceptable w.r.t. E. QED
Lemma 18. Let E′ ⊆ A, Z = (∆,Γ, φ) and Z ⇒E′ Y on α. Let Γ′ = Γ∩ prem(E ∪
{Y }) where E ⊆ E′. Then Z ′ = (∆ ∪ (Γ \ Γ′),Γ′, φ) ∈ A and Z ′ ⇒E Y .
PROOF. By P2, Z ′ ∈ A. Since Z ⇒E′ Y on α and ≺ is imle: Z ′ ⊀ ({α},∅, α).
Suppose φ = α. By definition, Γ′ ⊆ prem(E ∪ {Y }). Hence Z ′ ⇒E Y .
Suppose φ = uprise. Then α ∈ Γ, and by definition α ∈ Γ′. Since Γ′ ⊆ prem(E ∪ {Y }),
Z ′ ⇒E X . QED
We now prove a variant of the fundamental lemma:
Lemma 19. LetX,X ′ be acceptable w.r.t. an admissible extensionE of (A,D). Then:
1) Clem(E ∪ {X}) is admissible, and 2) X ′ is acceptable w.r.t. Clem(E ∪ {X}).
PROOF. Let E′ = E ∪ {X} and E′′ = Clem(E′). Note that prem(E′) = prem(E′′).
Proof of 1). We show that every argument in E′′ is acceptable w.r.t. E′′.
We first show that every argument in E′ is acceptable w.r.t. E′′. Suppose for contra-
diction that Y ∈ E′ is not acceptable w.r.t. E′′. Then ∃Z = (∆,Γ, φ) (φ = uprise or α)
s.t. Z ⇒E′′ Y on Y ′ = ({α},∅, α) (hence Z ⊀ Y ′), and:
¬∃Q ∈ E′′ s.t Q⇒{Z} Z (1)
Suppose Y = X . Since prem(E ∪ {X}) = prem(E′) = prem(E′′), Z ⇒E X . By
assumption of X acceptable w.r.t. E, ∃Q ∈ E (and so Q ∈ E′′) Q ⇒{Z} Z, contra-
dicting Eq. 1.
Suppose Y 6= X . Let Γ′ = Γ ∩ prem(E ∪ {Y }) (and so Γ \ Γ′ are premises of X that
are not premises in E or Y ). By Lemma 18, Z ′ = (∆ ∪ (Γ \ Γ′),Γ′, φ), Z ′ ⇒E Y .
By assumption of E admissible and so every Y in E acceptable w.r.t. E:
∃W = (Π,Σ, ψ) ∈ E s.t. W ⇒{Z′} Z ′(ψ = uprise or ψ = β) (2)
on β ∈ ∆∪ (Γ \Γ′), where W ⊀ ({β},∅, β), Σ ⊆ ∆∪ (Γ \Γ′). Consider two cases:
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1. Suppose β ∈ (Γ \ Γ′) (in which case β ∈ prem(X) and if ψ = uprise then
β ∈ Σ ∩ (Γ \ Γ′)).
Let W ′ be the logically equivalent (Σ ∩ ∆,Π ∪ (Σ ∩ (Γ \ Γ′)), ψ). Since
Π ⊆ prem(E) and (Σ ∩ (Γ \ Γ′)) ⊆ prem(X), and W ′ ⊀ ({β},∅, β), then
W ′ ⇒E X . By assumption of the acceptability of X w.r.t. E, ∃Q ∈ E s.t.
Q⇒{W ′} W ′. Since prem(W ′) ⊆ prem(Z), Q⇒{Z} Z, contradicting Eq. 1.
2. Suppose β ∈ ∆, (hence β ∈ prem(Z) and if ψ = uprise then β ∈ Σ ∩ ∆).
Let W ′ be the logically equivalent (Π ∪ (Σ ∩ (Γ \ Γ′)),Σ ∩ ∆, ψ). Since
prem(W ′) ⊆ prem(E′), then W ′ is in the epistemic closure E′′ of E′. Since
W ′ ⊀ ({β},∅, β), W ′ ⇒{Z} Z, contradicting Eq. 1.
We have shown ∀Y ∈ E′, Y ′ is acceptable w.r.t. E′′. By Lemma 16, all argu-
ments in E′′ are acceptable w.r.t. E′′. By Lemma 17, E′′ is conflict free. Hence
E′′ = Clem(E′) is admissible.
Proof of 2) Suppose for contradiction thatX ′ is not acceptable w.r.t. E′′. Then Z ⇒E′′
X ′ on ({α},∅, α), Z ⊀ ({α},∅, α) and ¬∃Q ∈ E′′ s.t. Q⇒{Z} Z.
Let Z = (∆,Γ, φ) (φ = uprise or α), Γ′ = Γ∩ prem(E ∪ {X ′}) (and so Γ \ Γ′ are premises
in X that are not premises in E or X ′).
By Lemma 18, Z ′ = (∆ ∪ (Γ \ Γ′),Γ′, φ), Z ′ ⇒E X ′.
By assumption of the acceptability ofX ′ w.r.t. E, ∃W = (Π,Σ, ψ) ∈ E,W ⇒{Z′} Z ′
on ({β},∅, β), where W ⊀ ({β},∅, β) and Σ ⊆ ∆∪ (Γ \Γ′). We can now reason as
in 1) above, contradicting ¬∃Q ∈ E′′ s.t. Q⇒{Z} Z. QED
Assuming the admissible set E in Lemma 19 is epistemically maximal, it immedi-
ately follows that:
Corollary 20. The set of all epistemically maximal admissible extensions of a dialec-
tical AF form a complete partial order w.r.t. set inclusion.
Lemma 21. Let E be an admissible extension of (A,D). Then E ⊆ F(E) and
Clem(F(E)) is admissible.
PROOF. By assumption of the admissibility of E, E ⊆ F(E). To show Clem(F(E))
is admissible, we make use of the function: F ∗(E,X) = Clem(E ∪ {X}).
Let F(E) \ E be the possibly countably infinite set {X1, . . . , Xn, . . .}, and let:
F ∗1 = F
∗(E,X1), F ∗2 = F
∗(F ∗1 , X2), . . . , F
∗
i = F
∗(F ∗i−1, Xi), . . .
That is to say, the sequence obtained by adding, one by one, the argumentsX1, . . . , Xn,
. . ., whereupon after each argument is added, the set is closed to obtain an em set. One
can straightforwardly show that:
∀i : Clem(E ∪ {X1, . . . , Xi}) = F ∗i (3)
That is to say, adding all arguments up to some i, and then closing, yields the same re-
sult as adding each argument one by one and closing prior to each subsequent addition.
Given Eq.3, it suffices to show that ∀F ∗i in the above sequence, F ∗i is admissible:
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Base case: By assumption of the acceptability of X1 w.r.t. E, and Lemma 19-1), F ∗1 =
F ∗(E,X1) is admissible. By Lemma 19-2), X2, . . . , Xi are acceptable w.r.t. F ∗1 .
General case: By inductive hypothesis, F ∗i−1 is admissible, and Xi is acceptable w.r.t.
F ∗i−1. By Lemma 19-1), F
∗
i is admissible. QED
We can now show the following key result:
Proposition 22. Every admissible extension of a dialectical AF is a subset of a pre-
ferred extension.
PROOF. Let E be an admissible extension. We consider two cases:
1. Suppose E = F(E). By Lemma 15, E is epistemically maximal.
2. Suppose E 6= F(E). By Lemma 21, E ⊆ F(E), and E′ = Clem(F(E)) is
admissible, where trivially, E ⊆ E′.
In both cases, E ⊆ E′ (E′ = E in case 1), where E′ is a em admissible set. By
Corollary 20, there exists a maximal under set inclusion em admissible set E′′ ⊇ E′.
There cannot exist a fixed point of F that is a strict superset of E′′, since by Lemma
15, such a fixed point would be em. Hence E′′ ⊇ E is a preferred extension. QED
The importance of Proposition 22 for monological and dialogical applications, is
that it suffices to show that an argument X is in an admissible extension, in order to
show that X is credulously justified under the preferred semantics.
3.5.2. Monotonicity and a Constructive Definition of the Grounded Extension
We now show monotonicity of a dialectical AF’s characteristic function, restricted
to the domain of epistemically maximal admissible sets.
Lemma 23. Let E,E′ be two em admissible extensions such that E ⊆ E′. Then
F(E) ⊆ F(E′).
PROOF. We show that X acceptable w.r.t. E (X ∈ F(E)) implies X acceptable w.r.t.
E′ (X ∈ F(E′)). Suppose X ∈ F(E), Z = (∆,Γ, φ) (φ = uprise or α), and Z ⇒E′ X on
X ′ = ({α},∅, α), and so Z ⊀ X ′.
1) Suppose Z ⇒E X . Since X ∈ F(E), ∃Y ∈ E s.t. Y ⇒{Z} Z. Since E ⊆ E′,
Y ∈ E′, and so X ∈ F(E′).
2) Suppose Z ;E X . We show X ∈ F(E′), by showing an argument in E′ that
defeats Z = (∆,Γ, φ).
Let Γ′ = Γ ∩ prem(E ∪ {X}) (Γ \ Γ′ are premises in E′ that are not in E ∪ {X}).
By Lemma 18, Z ′ = (∆ ∪ Γ \ Γ′,Γ′, φ), Z ′ ⇒E X . Since X is acceptable w.r.t E:
∃W = (Π,Σ, ψ) ∈ E (ψ = uprise or β), W ⇒{Z′} Z ′ on ({β},∅, β) and W ⊀
({β},∅, β).
• Suppose β ∈ Γ \ Γ′ (where if ψ = uprise then β ∈ Σ ∩ (Γ \ Γ′)). Hence ∃X ′ ∈
E′ \ E ∪ {X} s.t. β ∈ prem(X ′).
Given Σ ⊆ ∆ ∪ (Γ \ Γ′), let W ′ = (Σ ∩ ∆,Π ∪ (Σ ∩ (Γ \ Γ′)), ψ). Since
W ∈ E, then Π ⊆ prem(E). Since Σ ∩ (Γ \ Γ′) ⊆ prem(E′), W ′ ⇒E′ X ′ on
({β},∅, β). By assumption of admissibility of E′, ∃Q ∈ E′ s.t. Q⇒{W ′} W ′.
Since prem(W ′) ⊆ prem(Z), Q⇒{Z} Z.
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• Suppose β ∈ ∆ (ifψ =uprise, β ∈ Σ∩∆). LetW ′ = (Π∪(Σ∩(Γ\Γ′)),Σ∩∆, ψ). By
assumption of E′ being em, W ′ ∈ E′. Since Σ ∩∆ ⊆ prem(Z), W ′ ⇒{Z} Z.
QED
By definition of Clem, for any S ⊆ S′, Clem(S) ⊆ Clem(S′). Hence Lemma 23
immediately implies that:
Corollary 24. Let E,E′ be two em admissible extensions such that E ⊆ E′. Then
Clem(F(E)) ⊆ Clem(F(E′)).
Consider now a characteristic function Fp whose domain is sets E that are em
admissible, and that returns Clem(F(E)). By Lemma 21, Fp returns a em admissible
set. We then show that the fixed points of F and Fp coincide. Corollary 24 then
guarantees existence of a least fixed point of Fp and hence F . Formally:
Definition 19. Let (A,D) be a dialectical AF and A2p the set of all em admissible
subsets of A. Then Fp : A2p 7→ A2p, where Fp(E) = Clem(F(E)).
Proposition 25. Let (A,D) be a dialectical AF. Then there exists a least fixed point of
F(A,D).
PROOF. Firstly, let E be a fixed point of Fp. Since E is admissible, E ⊆ F(E). By
definition of Clem, F(E) ⊆ Clem(F(E)). Hence since E = Fp(E) = Clem(F(E)),
then it must be that E = F(E).
Secondly, let E be a fixed point of F (E = F(E)). By Lemma 15, E = F(E) is
em. By definition of Clem, if S is em then Clem(S) = S. Hence E = F(E) =
Clem(F(E)). That is, E is a fixed point of Fp. We have shown:
E is a fixed point of Fp iff E is a fixed point of F (4)
By Corollary 24, Fp is monotonic, and so there exists a least fixed point of Fp, which
given Eq. 4 is a least fixed point of F . QED
We can therefore identify the grounded extension of a dialectical AF as the least
fixed point of the framework’s characteristic function. If we define a sequence, starting
with the empty set, and iteratively applying Fp, the monotonically increasing sequence
approximates, and in the case of a finitary dialectical AF (see below) constructs, the
least fixed point (lfp) of Fp, i.e., the grounded extension.
Proposition 26. Let (A,D) be a dialectical AF , and F 0 = ∅, F i+1 = Fp(F i). Let E
be the grounded extension of (A,D). Then:
1. E ⊆⋃∞i=0(F i).
2. If (A,D) is finitary, i.e., ∀X ∈ A, the set {Y |(Y,X) ∈ D} is finite, then E =⋃∞
i=0(F
i)
PROOF. Trivially, F 0 = ∅ is em admissible. By Corollary 24, F 0, . . . , F i is a mono-
tonically increasing sequence. 1 is then shown, given that E is the lfp of Fp. 2 is then
shown by showing that Fp is ω−continuous. Let E′ = F 0 ∪ · · · ∪ Fn ∪ . . ., and let
X ∈ Fp(E′). Since there are finitely many arguments that defeat X , there exists a
number m such that X ∈ Fp(Fm). Therefore Fp(E′) = F 0 ∪ · · · ∪ Fn ∪ . . .. QED
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Finally, before formally showing satisfaction of these postulates, we discuss what
it means for a preference relation to be dialectically coherent when determining the
success of attacks as defeats. A preference Y ≺ X invalidating an attack from Y =
(∆,∅, α) to X = ({α},∅, α), can be interpreted as:
from amongst the inconsistent ∆ ∪ {α}, one preferentially accepts (i.e.,
includes in a complete extension E) arguments constructed from α and
rejects (excludes from E) arguments constructed from ∆ \ {α}.
Now, let Y ′ = (∆ ∪ {α},∅, φ) (φ = uprise or φ = α). Then Y ≺ X should imply
that Y ′ ≺ X . To see why, suppose Y ′ ⊀ X . But then this would contradict the
interpretation ascribed above to Y ≺ X , since Y ′ ⊀ X would mean that from amongst
the inconsistent ∆ ∪ {α}, one does not preferentially accept arguments constructed
from α and reject arguments constructed from ∆ ∪ {α} \ {α} (i.e., from ∆ \ {α}).
Moreover, suppose that for every αi in some inconsistent ∆ = {α1, . . ., αn}, one
constructs the argumentAi = (∆\{αi},∅, αi), and that ∀i: Ai ≺ ({αi},∅, αi). Rea-
soning as above, we would then have ∀i: A′i = (∆,∅, φi) ≺ ({αi},∅, αi) (φi = uprise
or φi = αi). In other words one preferentially accepts arguments built from α1 to
those built from ∆, from α2 to those built from ∆, and so on. But then (by Lemma
9), if E includes arguments with premises α1, . . . , αn then E includes arguments built
from premises ∆. Contradiction. Hence, it would be incoherent to have that ∀α ∈ ∆:
(∆,∅,uprise) ≺ ({α},∅, α) and (since ≺ is imle) (∅,∆,uprise) ≺ ({α},∅, α). Indeed, all
the results shown thus far would hold if instead of enforcing that attacks from (∅,∆,uprise)
on each α ∈ ∆ always succeed as a defeat (given that it would be incoherent to reject
the dialectical demonstration of inconsistency), one instead assumed a coherent prefer-
ence relation implying that for at least one α ∈ ∆, (∅,∆,uprise) defeats ({α},∅, α).17
Definition 20. [Dialectically Coherent Preference Relations] Let (A,D) be a pdAF
defined by B and ≺. Then ≺ is dialectically coherent iff
∀(∅,∆,uprise) ∈ A: ∃α ∈ ∆ such that (∅,∆,uprise) ⊀ ({α},∅, α). (Pref1)
∀ X = ({α},∅, α), Y = (∆,∅, α), Y ′ = (∆ ∪ {α},∅, φ) (φ = α or φ = uprise):
Y ≺ X implies Y ′ ≺ X . (Pref2)
In Section 4 we show that the Elitist preference satisfies Pref1 and Pref2. No-
tice that since ≺ is imle, Pref2 implies that if (∆,Γ, α) ≺ ({α},∅, α) then (∆,Γ ∪
{α}, φ) ≺ ({α},∅, α). To see why preference relations that do not satisfy Pref2 may
yield counter-intuitive results, suppose that in Example 28 we have that C ≺ A but
D ⊀ A, thus violating Pref2. We would then have an additional complete extension
E2 containing C and D, since the defeats by A and B on C and D would now be
defended by defeats from D on A and B. Counter-intuitively one would obtain a com-
plete extension containing C, despite a strict preference for A over C.
Finally, in now proving the non-interference and crash resistance postulates, we
will make use of the following result that holds for preference relations satisfying
Pref1:
17In Remark 8, it would remain the case that no admissible extension can contain A1 and F1 since a
coherent ≺ would imply that the unassailable X1 defeats either A1 on A1 or F1 on either B1 or C1.
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A= ({p},∅,p) B = ({p},{¬p},⊥)
C = ({¬p},∅,¬p)
X = (∅,{p,¬p},⊥)E1
i)
A= ({p},∅,p)
D= ({¬p},{p},⊥)
B = ({p},{¬p},⊥)
C = ({¬p},∅,¬p)
E1
ii)
A= ({p},∅,p) B = ({p},{¬p},⊥)
C = ({¬p},∅,¬p)
E1
iii)
C '= ({s ,¬p},∅,¬p)
X = (∅,{p,¬p},⊥)S = ({s},∅,s)
D= ({¬p},{p},⊥)
D= ({¬p},{p},⊥)
D'= ({¬p,p},∅,¬s)
X = (∅,{p,¬p},⊥)≺
≺
≺
≺
≺
≺
≺
≺
≺
Figure 3: i) All attacks are bidirectional; ii) Defeats resulting in single complete extensionE1; iii) Arguments
and defeats given base {p,¬p, s} and C ≺ A,C′ ⊀ A.
Lemma 27. Let (A,D) be a pdAF defined by B and≺, where≺ satisfies Pref1. Then
for any Y = (∆,Γ,uprise), Y ′ = (Γ,∆,uprise): Y ⇒{Y ′} Y ′ or Y ′ ⇒{Y } Y .
PROOF. Suppose for contradiction that Y ;{Y ′} Y ′ and Y ′ ;{Y } Y . Since ≺ is
imle, ∀α ∈ ∆ ∪ Γ: (∅,∆ ∪ Γ,uprise) ≺ ({α},∅, α), contradicting Pref1. QED
3.6. Contaminated Arguments
Dialectical AF s satisfy consistency and closure given relatively undemanding as-
sumptions as to the arguments constructed from a base, while assuming arbitrary pref-
erence relations and eschewing the need for checking the legitimacy of arguments’
assumptions. However, dropping consistency and subset minimality checks on argu-
ments’ assumptions may result in violation of the non-contamination postulates.
Example 28. Let B = {p,¬p}. Figure 3-i) shows arguments and attacks defined by
B. Suppose C ≺ A, D ≺ A, and so we have the defeats in Figure 3-ii) and E1 is
the single grounded, preferred and stable extension (notice that C ;E1 B since C
attacks B on A and C ≺ A). Suppose we now add s to B, and suppose the defined
arguments in Figure 3-iii). Again, assume only C ≺ A, D ≺ A. Intuitively, since s
is syntactically disjoint from p,¬p, we should continue to obtain a single grounded,
preferred and stable extension {A,B,X, S}.
Firstly, note that in contrast with the example in Section 3.2, we avoid the ‘con-
taminating effect’ (in the sense that the non-contamination postulates are violated) of
arguments that are used to entail syntactically disjoint conclusions via the ‘explosivity’
(recall footnote 9) of classically inconsistent premises. Although D′ defeats S (Figure
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3-iii), membership of S in any complete extensionE can never be invalidated since any
such E will contain the unassailable X that defeats D′ and so defends S. Hence crash
resistance is not violated (X’s defence of S also prevents violation of non-interference
that may occur due to the defeat by D′).
Secondly, with the addition of s to B, we can also construct C ′ = ({s,¬p},∅,¬p).
Since C ′ ⊀ A, we have that C ′ ⇒E1 A. We then have an additional complete exten-
sion E2 = {C,C ′, D, S,X}, since although A ⇒E2 V , V ∈ {C,C ′, D}, each such
defeat is defended given that C ′ ⇒{A} A. This is clearly counter-intuitive. We no
longer obtain a single grounded, preferred and stable extension containing A; indeed
the grounded extension E will now only contain S and X . Thus, by adding the syn-
tactically disjoint s to B, A is no longer a sceptically justified argument under any
semantics, and hence non-interference is violated.
The above example describes two types of contamination. The first type of contam-
ination may occur when the assumptions Γ of an argument X , with conclusion α 6= uprise,
include some inconsistent ∆ that is syntactically disjoint from Γ \∆∪{α}, and α may
be derived by the explosivity of ∆ (i.e., ∆ contaminates X by explosivity).
Remark 29. Notice that:
1. if α = uprise thenX is of the form (Σ,Λ,uprise) and cannot have a contaminating effect
due to explosivity, since X can only attack arguments on assumptions in Λ 6= ∅,
indicating that Σ ∪ Λ is inconsistent (recall Definition 11).
2. We emphasise above that α may be derived by explosivity since we are presently
considering representations of arguments independently of the proof theory used
for their construction. Hence, given an argument represented as ({p,¬p, r, r →
q},∅, q) it may be that q is derived from r, r → q, or explosively from p,¬p;
there is no way of telling which is the case without reference to the proof theory.
Note that the same reasoning applies to ({p,¬p},∅, q∨¬q) in that the tautology
may be derived from empty assumptions or explosively.
3. In addition to the arguments A in a dialectical AF satisfying P1, P2 and P3 in
Definition 17, we will later stipulate that if X ∈ A and ∆ contaminates X by
explosivity, then A also contains a falsum argument with assumptions ∆. (Intu-
itively, if an argument’s inconsistent assumptions are used to conclude a syntac-
tically disjoint conclusion via explosivity, then this can be explicitly recognised
by concluding the syntactically disjoint uprise).
Violation of the non-contamination postulates due to arguments contaminated by
explosivity is then avoided if the assumption in 3 above is satisfied. In Example 28,
{p,¬p} contaminates D′ by explosivity. However, we also have X = (∅, {p,¬p},uprise)
that defeats D′.
A second type of contamination may arise because we do not enforce that argu-
ments’ assumptions are subset minimal. Adding s to the premises of C yields the
non-subset minimal C ′ that is stronger than its subset minimal counterpart C (C ≺ A
but C ′ ⊀ A, and so C ′ ⇒E1 A). As discussed in Section 3.2, [43] shows that if subset
minimal arguments are not strengthened when adding redundant assumptions, then the
argumentation defined inferences of a framework consisting only of subset minimal
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arguments, is not changed when adding non-subset minimal arguments to the frame-
work. Intuitively, this also means that non-interference would not be violated due to
inclusion of non-subset minimal arguments. However, we have argued that ensuring
that assumptions are not redundant with respect to deriving an argument’s conclusion,
should not be enforced by computationally expensive checks on subset minimality, but
rather should in principle be enforceable by the proof system used for constructing ar-
guments. Recall that the issue here is not whether assumptions are actually used in
deriving the conclusion (footnote 8 on page 12 provides an example of a non-subset
minimal argument in which all assumptions are used in the proof), since one can readily
exclude assumptions not actually used in a given proof. Rather, the focus is on identify-
ing whether arguments specified ‘abstractly’ as tuples consisting of assumptions paired
with a conclusion (i.e.,without reference to a specific proof system) include obviously
redundant assumptions. One such obvious notion of redundancy is implied by the fol-
lowing property of classical logic (recall – Notation 3 – that ‖ denotes ‘syntactically
disjoint’; to spare on paretheses, we also assume that ∪ binds more tightly than ‖):
Proposition 30. Let B be a base. For all Γ ⊆ B, if Γ `c α and ∃∆ ⊆ Γ such that
∆‖(Γ \∆) ∪ {α}, then either ∆ `c uprise or Γ \∆ `c α.
PROOF. Suppose for contradiction that ∆ 0c uprise and Γ 0c α. By classical semantics,
there is a model M1 such that the value of all the formulas in Γ is 1 and the value of α
is 0. The same holds true of every model M ′1 that agrees with M1 on the interpretation
of symbols(Γ ∪ {α}). Moreover, since ∆ is consistent, there is a model M2 such that
the value of all the formulas in ∆ is 1. The same holds true of every model M ′2 that
agrees with M2 on the interpretation of symbols(∆). Now, since ∆‖Γ∪{α}, there is a
model M3 that agrees with M1 on the interpretation of symbols(Γ∪{α}) and with M2
on the interpretation of symbols(∆). For such a model the values of all the formulas in
∆ ∪ Γ is 1 and the value of α is 0, contradicting the hypothesis that ∆ ∪ Γ `c α. QED
Remark 31. Suppose a dialectical AF (A,D) such that Y = (Γ,∅, α) ∈ A, and
there is a non-empty ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ∆‖(Γ \∆) ∪ {α}. Then, given Proposition 30:
1. If Γ \∆ 6= ∅ then either:
i) ∆ ‘redundantly weakens’ 18 Y ′ = (Γ\∆,∅, α) (i.e., ∆ ⊆ assumptions(Y )
are trivially unnecessary for obtaining α), or
ii) Γ \∆ redundantly weakens Y ′ = (∆,∅, α) (where ∆ explosively entails
α by virtue of the inconsistency of ∆).
For example, given Y = ({s,¬p},∅,¬p) then ∆ = {s} redundantly weakens
Y ′ = ({¬p},∅,¬p) (case 1i). Given Y = ({q, p,¬p},¬s), then Γ \∆ = {q}
redundantly weakens Y ′ = ({p,¬p},∅,¬s) (case 1ii).
2. If Γ \∆ = ∅ then either:
18We use the term ‘weakens’ in keeping with the standard use of the term weakening in logic to denote
that an entailment from ∆ continues to be valid when adding some Γ to ∆.
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i) ∆ 0c uprise and so by classical semantics α must be a tautology, and Γ redun-
dantly weakens Y ′ = (∅,∅, α), or
ii) ∆ `c uprise and so either α is a tautology and Γ redundantly weakens Y ′ =
(∅,∅, α), or ∆ explosively entails α by virtue of the inconsistency of ∆.
For example, given Y = ({s},∅, p ∨ ¬p), then Γ = {s} redundantly weak-
ens Y ′ = (∅,∅, p ∨ ¬p) (case 2i). Given ({s,¬s},∅, p ∨ ¬p), then either
Γ = {s,¬s} redundantly weakens Y ′ = (∅,∅, p∨¬p), or p∨¬p is explosively
entailed from the inconsistent {s,¬s} (case 2ii).
3. In addition to P1, P2 and P3, we will later stipulate that if Y ∈ A, then:
– In case 1 A also includes the redundantly weakened Y ′ = (Γ \ ∆,∅, α),
or, given the redundantly weakened explosive Y ′ = (∆,∅, α), A also includes
(∆,∅,uprise) (e.g, Y ′′ = ({p,¬p},∅,uprise)) as stipulated in Remark 29-3.
– In case 2,A also includes the redundantly weakened Y ′ = (∅,∅, α), or, given
the explosive (∆,∅, α), A also includes (∆,∅,uprise) (e.g., ({s,¬s},∅,uprise)).
Let us formally define the above notions. We first identify the notion of a contam-
inated argument, and then further distinguish when such an argument is redundantly
and/or explosively contaminated.
Definition 21. [Contaminated arguments] Let Y be an argument with assumptions(Y )
= Γ and conclusion(Y ) = α. We say that Y is contaminated if there exists some non-
empty ∆ ⊆ Γ such that the following conditions hold:
1. ∆‖(Γ \∆) ∪ {α};
2. either Γ \∆ 6= ∅ or α 6= uprise.
We also say that any such ∆ is a contaminating set for Y .
Note that if an argument Y satisfies condition 1 and is not contaminated, then it
violates condition 2; that is to say, assumptions(Y ) cannot be partitioned into non-
empty syntactically disjoint subsets, so that the only contaminating ∆ for Y is such that
Γ \∆ = ∅, and conclusion(Y ) = uprise (recall that uprise does not appear in a base and so it
must be that Γ = ∆ is syntactically disjoint fromuprise). Hence Y has not been obtained by
some assumptions redundantly weakening an argument in any of the senses described
in Remark 31. Moreover, recalling Remark 29-1, such an argument is not explosively
contaminating. To illustrate, ({p,¬p},∅,uprise) is an example of such a Y that is not
contaminated (either redundantly or explosively). On the other hand ({p,¬p, r},∅,uprise)
is contaminated redundantly but not explosively, and ({p,¬p},∅, {q}) is contaminated
explosively but not redundantly.
Definition 22. [R-contaminated arguments] Let Y be a contaminated argument such
that assumptions(Y ) = Γ and conclusion(Y ) = α. We say that Y is redundantly
contaminated or R-contaminated if:
either (i) for some contaminating set ∆ ⊆ Γ for Y , Γ \∆ 6= ∅, or
(ii) the only contaminating set for Y is Γ itself (i.e., Γ \ ∆ = ∅) and
∆ 0c uprise.
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Conditions i) and ii) respectively state that Y is an R-contaminated argument of
the type described in 1 and 2i) of Remark 31. Arguments of the type described in
2ii), such as Y = ({p,¬p},∅, q ∨ ¬q), cannot be definitively recognised as being R-
contaminated. This is because it may be that X = (∅,∅, q ∨ ¬q) /∈ A. That is to say
Y has not been obtained by {p,¬p} redundantly weakening X . Rather, q ∨ ¬q is only
derived by explosivity and so we have (given Remark 29-3) that ({p,¬p},∅,uprise) ∈ A
(and so the property described in Remark 31-3 is satisfied). On the other hand one
can definitively identify Y = ({p,¬p, q, q → r},∅, r) as being R-contaminated, since
satisfaction of the property in Remark 31-3 means that either ({p,¬p},∅, r) ∈ A or
({q, q → r},∅, r) ∈ A. In either case Y includes a redundantly weakening set of
assumptions ({q, q → r} respectively {p,¬p}).
We now formally define explosively contaminated arguments:
Definition 23. [E-contaminated arguments] Let Y be a contaminated argument such
that conclusion(Y ) = α. We say that Y is explosively contaminated or E-contaminated
if α 6= uprise and ∆ `c uprise for some ∆ that is a contaminating set for Y .
Example 32. [Examples of (non) contaminated arguments]
1. X = ({p,¬p, q, q → r},∅, r), Y = ({p,¬p, q},∅, r),Z = ({p,¬p, q,¬q},∅, r)
are all both R-contaminated and E-contaminated.
2. Both ({p,¬p},∅, {q}) and ({p,¬p},∅, {q ∨ ¬q}) are E-contaminated, but not
R-contaminated;
3. Both ({p,¬p},∅, {p∧q}) and ({p,¬p, r},∅, r∧p) are neither R-contaminated
nor E-contaminated (as neither is contaminated);
4. ({p,¬p, r},∅,uprise) is R-contaminated but not E-contaminated. ({p,¬p},∅,uprise) is
neither R-contaminated nor E-contaminated
For the examples in 1 above, if the property in Remark 31-3 is satisfied, then:
• if X ∈ A then either X ′ = ({q, q → r},∅, r) ∈ A and X ′ has been redundantly
weakened by {p,¬p}, or the explosive X ′′ = ({p,¬p},∅, r) has been redundantly
weakened by {q, q → r}, and so ({p,¬p},∅,uprise) ∈ A.
• If Y ∈ A then ({p,¬p},∅,uprise) ∈ A.
• If Z ∈ A then:
– either ({q,¬q},∅, r) ∈ A or ({p,¬p},∅,uprise) ∈ A, and
– either ({p,¬p},∅, r) ∈ A or ({q,¬q},∅,uprise) ∈ A.
3.7. Coherent Preference Relations and Partially Instantiated Dialectical AF s
Section 4 describes a propositional natural deduction proof theory that does not
license construction of R-contaminated arguments. However, satisfaction of the non-
contamination postulates when using proof systems that do generate such arguments,
requires that preference relations are ‘redundance-coherent’ in the sense that arguments
are not strengthened when redundantly weakening with syntactically disjoint assump-
tions (the Elitist preference is shown to be redundance-coherent in Section 4):
Definition 24. [Redundance-Coherent Preference Relations] Let A be a set of di-
alectical arguments. A strict partial ordering ≺ over A is redundance-coherent iff
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∀X,Y, Y ′ such that Y = (Γ,∅, α), Y ′ = (∆ ∪ Γ,∅, α), and ∆‖Γ ∪ {α}: if
Y ≺ X then Y ′ ≺ X .
We now define partially instantiated dialecticalAF s (pdAF s) whose argumentsA sat-
isfy P1, P2 and P3, and the property described in Remark 31-3 (which, as is easy to ver-
ify, subsumes the property in Remark 29-3). We also distinguish non-redundant pdAF s
whose arguments are obtained by proof theories that do not generate R-contaminated
arguments. In this case it suffices that A satisfies the property relating to arguments
contaminated by explosivity described in Remark 29-3.
Definition 25. [(Non-redundant) Partially Instantiated DialecticalAF] Let (A,D)
be a dialectical AF such that D is the defeat relation over A defined by the attacks C
and the strict partial ordering ≺ over A.
• (A,D) is a partially instantiated dialectical AF (pdAF ) if A is any subset of the
dialectical arguments defined by a base B such that A satisfies P1, P2 and P3, and:
(P4) If (Γ,∅, α) ∈ A, ∆ ⊆ Γ, ∆ 6= ∅ and ∆‖Γ\∆∪{α}, then either (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A
or (Γ \∆,∅, α) ∈ A.
• (A,D) is a non-redundant pdAF if A is any subset of the dialectical arguments
defined by a base B such that A satisfies P1, P2 and P3, and:
(P4′) If (Γ,∅, α) ∈ A, ∆ ⊆ Γ, ∆ 6= ∅ and ∆‖(Γ \∆) ∪ {α}, then (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A.
(P5) ¬∃Y ∈ A such that Y is R-contaminated.
We say that (A,D) is a (non-redundant) pdAF defined by B and ≺.
By virtue of non-redundant pdAF s satisfying P5, any argument in such a pdAF
that satisfies the precondition of P4 (and hence P4′) can only be explosively contami-
nated, and the argument’s assumptions cannot be partitioned into non-empty syntacti-
cally disjoint subsets. Hence it suffices that a non-redundant pdAF satisfy P4′. Indeed,
we leave it to the reader to verify that:
Remark 33. Let (A,D) be a non-redundant pdAF , and (Γ,∅, α) ∈ A, ∆ ⊆ Γ,
∆ 6= ∅ and ∆‖(Γ \∆) ∪ {α}. Then it must be the case that ∆ = Γ.
Henceforth, when referring to ‘pdAF s’ we assume pdAF s in the general sense
or non-redundant pdAF s. Finally note that since the arguments in (non-redundant)
pdAF s satisfy P1, P2 and P3, the results in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 all hold for such
frameworks.
Let us now review the significance of the concepts thus far introduced. Suppose the
pdAF (A,D) in Example 28 satisfies P4. Given the R-contaminated C ′ ∈ A, P4 im-
pliesC ∈ A. Moreover, if the pdAF ’s preference relation is redundance-coherent, then
C ≺ A impliesC ′ ≺ A. HenceC ′ ;{A} A and non-interference is no longer violated.
Furthermore, we have already noted that if P4 is satisfied, then an E-contaminated ar-
gument Y implies existence of an argument concluding uprise from the inconsistent ∆
in assumptions(Y ), and this ensures satisfaction of the non-contamination postulates.
Now, as will be shown in Section 4, one can define proof theories that do not generate
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R-contaminated arguments (such as C ′). However, to the best of our knowledge, proof
theories cannot be defined so as to exclude non subset minimal arguments. We have
therefore defined non-redundant pdAF s that only need satisfy the property P4′ implied
by P4, and as shown in the following section, need not assume redundance-coherent
preference relations (given the absence of R-contaminated arguments) in order that the
non-contamination postulates are satisfied.
3.7.1. Proving the Non-interference and Crash Resistance Postulates
The non-interference and crash resistance postulates [16] (reviewed in Section 2.2)
are stated with respect to AF s defined by bases B1, B2 and B = B1 ∪ B2. For pdAF s,
we also need to account for preferences over arguments defined by these bases.
Definition 26. [Composing pdAF s] Let (A1,D1) defined byB1 and≺1, and (A2,D2)
defined by B2 and ≺2. Then (A,D) defined by B = B1 ∪ B2 and ≺ is said to be com-
posed from (A1,D1) and (A2,D2), denoted (A,D) = (A1,D1)⊕ (A2,D2), iff:
1. A1 ∪ A2 ⊆ A.19
2. ∀X ∈ A : if assumptions(X) ⊆ B1 then X ∈ A1 and if assumptions(X) ⊆ B2
then X ∈ A2.
3. ≺ is any preference ordering such that:
• ∀X1, Y1 ∈ A1 : (X1, Y1) ∈≺1 iff (X1, Y1) ∈≺
• ∀X2, Y2 ∈ A2 : (X2, Y2) ∈≺2 iff (X2, Y2) ∈≺
The above formalises the assumption that preferences defined over any set of ar-
guments A, remain unchanged when adding further arguments to A (3), and that the
arguments constructed from some base B are exactly those constructed from the subset
B of some base B ∪ B′ (1 and 2). Intuitively, if the available resources are the limit-
ing factor determining construction of arguments, then we assume the same resources
available for constructing arguments from B, independently of whether B is included
in a larger base B ∪ B′.
Remark 34. [Assumptions on composed pdAF s] In what follows, when stating that
(A,D) = (A1,D1)⊕ (A2,D2), we assume the pdAF s defined by B1, ≺1 and B2, ≺2
and B1 ∪ B2, ≺ respectively, and that B1‖B2 (B1 is syntactically disjoint from B2).
Remark 35. [Assumptions on Preference Relations in (non-redundant) pdAF s]
In the following results, when referring to pdAF s in general, we will assume pdAF s
defined by preference relations that satisfy Pref1 (and hence the results can make use
of Lemma 27) and are redundance-coherent. When referring to non-redundant pdAF s,
we assume only that the preference relations satisfy Pref1.
Lemma 36. Let (A,D) = (A1,D1)⊕ (A2,D2). Suppose Y ∈ A\A1, X ∈ A1, and
Y ⇒S⊆A X on X ′ = (α,∅, α).
Let Y = (∆,Γ, φ), ∆1 = ∆ ∩ B1, Γ1 = Γ ∩ B1, ∆2 = ∆ ∩ B2, Γ2 = Γ ∩ B2. Then:
19It is obvious to then see that for the attack relations C1, C2 and C that are used to obtain the defeats D1,
D2 and D: (C1 ∪ C2) ⊆ C.
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1. (∆2,Γ2,uprise) ∈ A2, or
2. (∆1,Γ1,uprise) ∈ A1, or
3. (∆1,Γ1, α) ∈ A1
PROOF. Suppose φ = uprise. Since Y ∈ A \ A1, then by Definition 26.2, ∆2 ∪ Γ2 6= ∅.
Since uprise is not an atom in B, then ∆2 ∪ Γ2‖∆1 ∪ Γ1 ∪ {uprise}. By P4 and P2, either
Y1 = (∆1,Γ1,uprise) ∈ A and (by Definition 26.2), Y1 ∈ A1, or Y2 = (∆2,Γ2,uprise) ∈ A
and (by Definition 26.2), Y2 ∈ A2. Suppose φ = α. Since X ′ ∈ A1, ∆2 ∪ Γ2‖α.
Hence ∆2∪Γ2‖∆1∪Γ1∪{α}. By P4 and P2: Y1 = (∆1,Γ1, α) ∈ A hence Y1 ∈ A1,
or Y2 = (∆2,Γ2,uprise) ∈ A hence Y2 ∈ A2. QED
Lemma 37. Let (A,D) = (A1,D1)⊕ (A2,D2), andE′ ⊆ A,E = E′∩A1. Suppose
Y = (∆,Γ, φ) ∈ A, X ∈ A ∩A1, Y ⇒E′ X on X ′ = ({α},∅, α), and:
A1 X is acceptable w.r.t. E in (A1,D1);
A2 ∀∆ ⊆ prem(E′ \E): (prem(A) = ∆)→ (A ∈ E′ and A is acceptable w.r.t. E′)
Then ∃Z ∈ E′ such that Z ⇒{Y } Y .
PROOF. 1) Suppose Y ∈ A1. Since E = E′ ∩ A1 and (given X ∈ A1) Γ ⊆
prem(E′ ∪ {X}) ∩ B1, then (given Y ⊀ X ′ implies Y ⊀1 X ′) Y ⇒E⊆A1 X .
Given A1, ∃Z ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y on Y ′, Z ⊀1 Y ′ and so Z ⊀ Y ′. Since E ⊆ E′,
then Z ∈ E′ and Z ⇒{Y } Y on Y ′.
2) Suppose Y ∈ A \A1. By Lemma 36, either: i) Y1 = (∆∩B1,Γ∩B1,uprise) ∈ A1, or
ii) Y1 = (∆ ∩ B1,Γ ∩ B1, α) ∈ A1, or iii) Y2 = (∆ ∩ B2,Γ ∩ B2,uprise) ∈ A2.
2,1) Suppose we are in cases i) or ii). Γ∩B1 ⊆ prem(E) and by redundance-coherence
of ≺, Y ⊀ X ′ implies Y1 ⊀ X ′. Hence Y1 ⊀1 X ′ and Y1 ⇒E⊆A1 X . Given A1,
∃Z ∈ E ⊆ E′, Z ⇒{Y1} Y1. Since prem(Y1) ⊆ prem(Y ), Z ⇒{Y } Y .
2,2) Suppose we are in case iii). By P2, Y ′2 = (Γ ∩ B2,∆ ∩ B2,uprise) ∈ A2. Γ ∩ B2 ⊆
prem(E′ \ E) and so by A2, Y ′2 ∈ E′. By Lemma 27:
Y ′2 ⇒{Y2} Y2 and (since prem(Y2) ⊆ prem(Y )) the result is shown for Z = Y ′2 , or
Y2 ⇒{Y ′2} Y ′2 , in which case, since Y ′2 is acceptable w.r.t. E′ (by A2), then ∃Z ∈
E′, Z ⇒{Y2} Y2, hence Z ⇒{Y } Y . QED
Corollary 38. Lemma 37 holds for non-redundant pdAF s (A,D).
PROOF. 1) is shown as in Lemma 37. In 2), Y /∈ A1 implies (∆∩B2)∪ (Γ∩B2) 6= ∅.
Suppose (∆∩B1)∪(Γ∩B1) 6= ∅. Then (∆∩B2)∪(Γ∩B2) ‖ (∆∩B1)∪(Γ∩B1)∪{φ},
contradicting (A,D) is non-redundant (recall Remark 33). Hence assumptions(Y ) is a
non-empty subset of B2 and Y ∈ A2. If φ = α20, then since assumptions(Y )‖{α}, by
P4′ (∆,Γ,uprise) ∈ A2. We then reason as in 2.2) in Lemma 37, which does not assume
redundance-coherent preference relations, to conclude ∃Z ∈ E′, Z ⇒{Y } Y . QED
Lemma 39. Let (A,D) = (A1,D1)⊕ (A2,D2). Then:
20Note that in fact, it cannot be that φ = uprise since this would mean prem(X) ∩ Γ 6= ∅, contradicting
assumptions(Y ) ⊆ B2.
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If E is a complete extension of (A1,D1) then ∃E′ ⊇ E s.t. E′ is a
complete extension of (A,D) and E = E′ ∩ A1
PROOF. Suppose E is a complete extension of (A1,D1). Let E′ ⊇ E, such that
E = E′ ∩ A1, and let us assume:
E′ \ E = {Y ∈ A \ A1|Y is acceptable w.r.t. E′} (Ass1).
(That there exists such an E′ with E′ \ E 6= ∅, can be seen by the limiting case in
which E′ \E is the set of unassailable arguments inA\A1; these are acceptable w.r.t.
any E′ ⊆ A).
Firstly, suppose ∆ ⊆ prem(E′ \ E), prem(V ) = ∆. Hence V ∈ A \ A1. Suppose
Z ⇒E′ V on some β. Since prem(V ) ⊆ prem(E′ \ E), then for some Y ∈ E′ \ E,
Z ⇒E′ Y on β. By Ass1, Y is acceptable w.r.t. E′ and so ∃W ∈ E′, W ⇒{Z} Z.
Hence V is acceptable w.r.t. E′. Hence:
∀∆ ⊆ prem(E′ \ E) : (prem(A) = ∆)→ A ∈ E′ and A acceptable w.r.t. E′ (5)
We show X ∈ E implies X acceptable w.r.t. E′. Let Y ∈ A, Y ⇒E′ X . Since E is
a complete extension of (A1,D1), X is acceptable w.r.t. E in (A1,D1). Hence, given
Eq. 5, we can apply Lemma 37 to conclude that ∃Z ∈ E′ s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y . Hence X
acceptable w.r.t. E′.
Given Ass1 we now have that all arguments in E′ are acceptable w.r.t. E′. Hence by
Lemma 17, E′ is conflict free. To show E′ is complete, it then remains to show (given
Ass1) that X ∈ A1, X /∈ E′ implies X is not acceptable w.r.t. E′. Suppose some such
X . Since E is a complete extension of (A1,D1), X is not acceptable w.r.t. E. Hence:
∃Y ∈ A1, Y ⇒E X,¬∃Z ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y. (6)
Since E ⊆ E′, Y ⇒E′ X . Suppose for contradiction that X is acceptable w.r.t. E′ in
(A,D). Hence:
∃Z = (∆,Γ, φ) ∈ E′ s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y on Y ′ = ({α},∅, α) (and so Z ⊀ Y ′) (7)
1) Suppose Z ∈ A1. Hence Z ∈ E. Z ⊀ Y ′ implies Z ⊀1 Y ′, and so Z ⇒{Y } Y in
(A1,D1), contradicting Eq.6.
2) Suppose Z ∈ A\A1. Since Γ ⊆ prem(Y ), Y ∈ A1, it must be that Γ ⊆ B1. Hence
by Lemma 36 either: i) Z1 = (∆ ∩ B1,Γ,uprise) ∈ A1, or ii) Z1 = (∆ ∩ B1,Γ, α) ∈ A1,
or iii) Z2 = (∆ ∩ B2,∅,uprise) ∈ A2.
2.1) In case i) or ii), since (∆ ∩ B1) ⊆ prem(E), and E is a complete extension of
(A1,D1), then by Lemma 9, Z1 ∈ E. Since Z ⊀ Y ′, and ≺ is redundance-coherent,
Z1 ⊀ Y ′. Hence Z1 ⊀1 Y ′, and Z1 ⇒{Y } Y , contradicting Eq.6.
2.2) In case iii). By Eq.5, Z2 ∈ E′. But then (∅,∆ ∩ B2,uprise) ⇒E′ Z2, contradicting
Z2 acceptable w.r.t. E′. QED
Corollary 40. Lemma 39 holds for non-redundant pdAF s.
PROOF. Proof proceeds exactly as in Lemma 39, except that:
• ‘Corollary 38’ replaces ‘Lemma 37’ (underlined in the proof of Lemma 39);
• In 2) in the proof of Lemma 39, we show as in Corollary 38 that Z ∈ A2 (substituting
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‘Z ∈ A2’ for ‘Y ∈ A2’ in Corollary 38) and (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A2. We then only need
reason to a contradiction as in 2.2) of Lemma 39, which does not assume redundance-
coherent preference relations. QED
Lemma 41. Let (A,D) = (A1,D1)⊕ (A2,D2). Then if E′ is a complete extension
of (A,D) then E = E′ ∩ A1 is a complete extension of (A1,D1).
PROOF. Suppose E′ is a complete extension of (A,D).
Part 1 SinceE′ is conflict free thenE = E′∩A1 is conflict free21. Suppose for contra-
diction that E = E′ ∩A1 is not an admissible extension of (A1,D1). Hence ∃X ∈ E,
Y ∈ A1, Y ⇒E X on X ′ (hence Y ⊀1 X ′), and:
¬∃Z ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y. (8)
Since Y ⊀ X ′, and prem(E) ⊆ prem(E′), then Y ⇒E′ X . By assumption of E′
being a complete extension of (A,D):
Z = (∆,Γ, φ) ∈ E′ s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y on Y ′ = ({α},∅, α), Z ⊀ Y ′.
1) Suppose Z ∈ A1. Then Z ∈ E. Since Z ⊀1 Y ′, Z ⇒{Y } Y , contradicting Eq.8.
2) Suppose Z ∈ A \ A1. Since Γ ⊆ prem(Y ), Y ∈ A1, it must be that Γ ⊆ B1. We
then reason to a contradiction as in 2) in the proof of Lemma 39, except that:
in 2.1), we have that since (∆ ∩ B1) ⊆ prem(E′) and E′ is a complete extension of
(A,D), then by Lemma 9 Z1 ∈ E′, hence Z1 ∈ E;
in 2.2), Z2 ∈ E′ by virtue of E′ being complete and Lemma 9.
Part 2 We have shown that E is admissible. Suppose for contradiction that E is not
complete. Hence ∃X /∈ E that is acceptable w.r.t. E. We show X is acceptable w.r.t.
E′. Suppose:
Y = (∆,Γ, φ), Y ⇒E′ X on X ′ = ({α},∅, α), hence Y ⊀ X ′.
Since E′ is complete, then (by Lemma 9):
∀∆ ⊆ prem(E′ \ E) : (prem(A) = ∆)→ A ∈ E′ and A acceptable w.r.t. E′ (9)
Given Eq. 9 and X is acceptable w.r.t. E, we can apply Lemma 37 to conclude that
∃Z ∈ E′ s.t. Z ⇒{Y } Y . Hence X is acceptable w.r.t. E′. Since E′ is complete,
X ∈ E′. Hence X ∈ E = E′ ∩ A1. Contradiction. QED
Corollary 42. Lemma 41 holds for non-redundant pdAF s.
PROOF. Proof as in Lemma 41, except:
• ‘Corollary 38’ replaces ‘Lemma 37’ (underlined);
• In 2) in Part 1 of the proof of Lemma 41, we show as in Corollary 38 that Z ∈
A2 (substituting ‘Z ∈ A2’ for ‘Y ∈ A2’ in Corollary 38) and (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A2.
Since (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ E′ by virtue of E′ being complete and Lemma 9, this leads to a
contradiction as in 2.2) in the proof of Lemma 39. QED
21Trivially, ∀E,E′ s.t. E ⊆ E′,X ⇒E Y impliesX ⇒E′ Y . Hence supposeE′ is conflict free andE
is not conflict free. Then X,Y ∈ E ⊆ E′, X ⇒E Y and so X ⇒E′ Y , contradicting E′ is conflict free.
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The following is a corollary of Lemmas 39 and 41 and Corollaries 40 and 42:
Corollary 43. Let (A,D) = (A1,D1) ⊕ (A2,D2), where (A,D), (A1,D1) and
(A2,D2) are (non-redundant) pdAF s. Then:
1. If E is a complete extension of (A1,D1) then there exist complete extensions
{E1, . . . , En} of (A,D) such that for i = 1 . . . n, E = Ei ∩ A1.
2. If {E1, . . . , En} are complete extensions of (A,D) such that for i = 1 . . . n,
E = Ei ∩ A1, then E is a complete extension of (A1,D1).
That there is a one to (possibly) many mapping between complete extensions of
(A1,D1) and (A,D) is witnessed by an example in which B1 = {a}, B2 = {b,¬b},
B = {a, b,¬b}, and ≺1=≺2=≺= ∅. Then E is a single complete extension of
(A1,D1) containing A = ({a},∅, a) and E1 and E2 are the complete extensions of
(A,D), where E1 contains A and ({b},∅, b), and E2 contains A and ({¬b},∅,¬b).
Note that Corollary 43 immediately implies that:
1. X is credulously justified under the complete semantics in (A1,D1) iff X is
credulously justified under the complete semantics in (A,D).
2. X is sceptically justified under the complete semantics in (A1,D1) iffX is scep-
tically justified under the complete semantics in (A,D).
In [16, 61], the non-interference and crash resistance postulates are formulated
w.r.t. the ‘consequences’ of propositional instantiations of AFs. Our formalisation
of symbols (Definition 4) and syntactic disjointedness for first order theories (Notation
3) allows us to generalise these postulates to first order instantiations ofAF s, and show
their satisfaction by (non-redundant) pdAF s.
Definition 27. [Consequence Relation for pdAF s] Let (A,D) be a (non-redundant)
pdAF . Then CnT ((A,D)) = {claims(E1), . . . , claims(En)} where E1, . . . , En are
the T extensions of (A,D), T ∈ {complete, grounded, preferred, stable}.
Referring to the above example, and writing Cncp as an abbreviation for Cncomplete,
Cncp((A1,D1)) = {Cn({a})}22 and Cncp ((A,D)) = {Cn({a, b}), Cn({a,¬b})}.
Recall that we define claims(E) as the conclusions of unconditional arguments that
have empty suppositions. Also recall the notation B|Sy in Notation 3.
Definition 28. [Non Interference] Let (A1,D1) be defined by B1 and ≺1, (A2,D2)
defined by B2 and ≺2, and (A,D) defined by B1 ∪ B2 and ≺, where (A,D) =
(A1,D1)⊕ (A2,D2), and B1‖B2. Then non-interference is satisfied iff:
Cncp((A1,D1))|symbols(B1) = Cncp((A,D))|symbols(B1)
Theorem 44. [Non Interference] Non-interference is satisfied by (non-redundant) pdAF s.
22Where ‘Cn’ is the classical consequence relation.
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PROOF.. By Corollary 43: E is a complete extension of (A1,D1) iff {E1, . . . , En} are
complete extensions of (A,D), where for i = 1 . . . n, E = Ei ∩ A1. Then assuming
unconditional arguments X s.t. symbols(conclusion(X)) ⊆ symbols(B1):
1) If X ∈ E then ∀Ei, X ∈ Ei.
2) If X ∈ Ei, X ∈ A ∩A1, then for j = 1 . . . n, X ∈ Ej and X ∈ E.
3) If X = (∆,∅, α) ∈ Ei, X ∈ A \ A1, then ∆ = Π ∪ Σ, where Π ⊆ B1, Σ ⊆ B2,
Σ 6= ∅ (since if Σ = ∅ then given Definition 26.2, X ∈ A1) and so Σ‖Π ∪ {α}.
• Assuming arbitrary pdAF s, then by P4, either:
3.1) X ′ = (Π,∅, α) ∈ A and so (by Definition 26.2), X ′ ∈ A1. By Lemma 9,
X ′ ∈ Ei, and we are in case 2), or
3.2) X ′ = (Σ,∅,uprise) ∈ A. By Lemma 9, X ′ ∈ Ei, contradicting Theorem 11.
• Assuming non-redundant pdAF s, then it must be that Π = ∅ (recall Remark 33),
and so by P4′, X ′ = (Σ,∅,uprise) ∈ A, and we are in case 3.2).
Cases 2) & 3) show that if an unconditional X is in some Ei and symbols(α) ⊆
symbols(B1), then for j = 1 . . . n, there is an X ′ ∈ Ej where X ′ has conclusion
α, and X ′ ∈ E. This, together with 1), establishes that: claims(E)|symbols(B1) =
claims(Ei)|symbols(B1), where for i = 1 . . . n, E = Ei ∩ A1. Hence the theorem is
shown. QED
In our example, Cncp((A1,D1))|symbols(B1) = {{a}} and Cncp((A,D)) = {{a}}.
We now prove crash resistance, adapting the strategy employed in [16, 61]. We
show that (non-redundant) pdAF s are non-trivial, and then show that this property,
together with non-interference, implies crash resistance.
Lemma 45. Let Sy be any set of predicate, function and constant symbols. Then there
exist (non-redundant) pdAF s (A1,D1) and (A2,D2), respectively defined by B1,≺1
and B2,≺2, s.t. symbols(B1) = symbols(B2) = Sy, and Cncp((A1,D1))|Sy 6=
Cncp((A2,D2))|Sy.
PROOF. Let {P1, . . . , Pn} be the predicate symbols in Sy, and for i = 1 . . . n, let
αi denote the atomic formula Pi(
−→
ti ) where
−→
ti is a vector of 0 or more terms, and
such that
⋃n
i=1 symbols(
−→
ti ) = {t|t is a function or constant symbol in Sy}. Let B1
= {α1, . . . , αn}, B2 = {α1 → α1, . . . , αn → αn}, ≺1=≺2= ∅. Then each pdAF
has a single complete extension whose unconditional arguments have conclusions that
differ: Cncp((A1,D1)) = {Cn({α1, . . . , αn})} 6= Cncp((A2,D2)) = {Cn({α1 →
α1, . . . , αn → αn})}. QED
Definition 29. [Contaminating Base] Let B1 be a base such that symbols(B1) ⊂
symbols(L). B1 is said to be contaminating for (non-redundant) pdAFs iff:
there exists a (A1,D1) defined by B1,≺1, such that for any B2 such that (A2,D2) is
defined by B2,≺2, and B1‖B2: Cncp((A1,D1)) = Cncp((A,D)), where (A,D) =
(A1,D1) ⊕ (A2,D2).
Theorem 46. [Crash Resistance] There does not exist a contaminating base B for
pdAF s and non-redundant pdAF s.
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PROOF. Suppose for contradiction that there exists a contaminating base B1. Hence
symbols(B1) ⊂ symbols(L). Let Sy = symbols(L) \ symbols(B1). By Lemma 45,
there exists a pdAF3 and pdAF4 respectively defined by B3,≺3 and B4,≺4, such that
symbols(B3) = symbols(B4) = Sy, and:
Cncp(pdAF3)|Sy 6= Cncp(pdAF4)|Sy. (1)
Since B1 is contaminating, then there is a pdAF1 = (A1,D1) such that:
Cncp(pdAF1) = Cncp(pdAF1 ⊕ pdAF3) = Cncp(pdAF1 ⊕ pdAF4)
Hence Cncp(pdAF1 ⊕ pdAF3)|Sy = Cncp(pdAF1 ⊕ pdAF4)|Sy. This, together with
(1) implies thatCncp(pdAF3)|Sy 6= Cncp(pdAF1⊕pdAF3)|Sy orCncp(pdAF4)|Sy 6=
Cncp(pdAF1 ⊕ pdAF4)|Sy.
Since symbols(B3) = symbols(B4) = Sy, we immediately have that eitherCncp(pdAF3)|B3
6= Cncp(pdAF1 ⊕ pdAF3)|B3 or Cncp(pdAF4)|B4 6= Cncp(pdAF1 ⊕ pdAF4)|B4 . In
either case, Theorem 44 (non-interference) is violated. QED
4. Instantiating Dialectical Classical Frameworks
4.1. C-Intelim Argumentation
We now instantiate pdAF s in which, in contrast with standard approaches to Cl-
Arg [1, 33, 43], the proof theoretic means for constructing arguments is given. Indeed,
we suggest that arguments conceived of as assumptions in support of a conclusion
should be understood as ‘argument schemata’ that are concretely realised as ‘argu-
ments proper’ through provision of the proof theoretic means by which the conclusion
is inferred from the assumption. We argue that the persuasive force of a non trivial
argument partly depends on whether valid reasoning steps have been employed in in-
ferring the argument’s conclusion. For example, a mathematical argument claiming
that a certain theorem follows from the Euclidean axioms would be incomplete and en-
tirely unpersuasive without explicit representation of the proof steps involved. It is the
means by which the conclusion is obtained that renders the argument understandable,
and furthermore, one would not want to rely on the recipient expending resources to
reconstruct the proof from assumptions to conclusion (we revisit this issue in Section 5
when discussing the ‘transparency’ postulate proposed for practical applications [27]).
In this section we therefore ‘instantiate’ pdAF s with propositional natural deduc-
tion proofs. We present a non-standard version of classical natural deduction which,
given some straightforward restrictions on the application of the rules, does not allow
construction of R-contaminated arguments and admits definition of a simple notion
of argument ‘depth’. The latter may be taken to reflect the inferential capabilities of
resource-bounded agents. We then show that arguments constructed under any fixed
bound on their depth, define non-redundant pdAF s that satisfy the rationality postu-
lates. In dialectical frameworks we use the word “assumption” as a general term that
refers to both premises and suppositions.
4.1.1. C-Intelim Natural Deduction
Natural deduction proofs apply intuitive introduction and elimination rules (or “in-
telim rules” for short) that are akin to natural modes of human reasoning (in contrast
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to other proof theories e.g., axiomatic systems, Gentzen-style sequent calculi or reso-
lution), and are thus particularly appropriate if one is to simulate human understanding
and reasoning.23
We use a non-standard version of classical natural deduction [20, 22, 23], that we
call “C-intelim” (for “classical intelim”). As discussed in [20, 24], this version is more
faithful to the intuitive classical meaning of the logical operators and naturally suggests
a simple measure of the “depth” of an argument. This is used to define a hierarchy of
tractable, albeit increasingly complex, approximations to classical propositional logic
that converge to it in the limit (for ideal “unbounded” agents). Each level in the hi-
erarchy equates with increments in the maximum depth of the arguments that can be
constructed and the resources required to construct such arguments. Thus, C-intelim
proofs provide a perspicuous account of argumentation for resource-bounded agents
employing natural rules that are faithful to the classical interpretation of the logical
operators.
The C-intelim rules are displayed in Table 1. Besides the intelim rules we have two
extra rules for the “falsum” constantuprise (the first two displayed in Table 2), representing
a sentence which is false in every possible world. RNC (“Rule of Non-Contradiction”)
simply says that two contradictory sentences cannot be both true, and the XFQ (Ex
Falso Quodlibet) rule says that every sentence follows from uprise. The two falsum rules
taken together imply that any arbitrary conclusion follows from a contradiction.
The intelim and falsum rules contain no discharge rules, namely rules that involve
the temporary introduction of assumptions that are subsequently “discharged”, to the
effect that their conclusion no longer depends on them.24 To obtain a complete set of
rules for classical propositional logic we only need add a single discharge rule: if we
have a deduction D1 of ψ depending on assumptions Γ ∪ {ϕ} and a deduction D2 of
ψ depending on assumptions ∆ ∪ {¬ϕ}, we thereby have a deduction of ψ depending
on Γ ∪ ∆. This typical pattern of classical case reasoning relies on the Aristotelian
principle of bivalence; a cornerstone of classical semantics whereby any sentence is
either true or false, and there are no other possibilities. Hence we call this pattern Rule
of Bivalence (RB), which is the third rule displayed in Table 2 where the conclusion ψ
does not depend on the “discharged” assumptions ϕ and ¬ϕ that are enclosed in square
brackets.
C-intelim proofs can be presented using the standard natural deduction tree format
in which the conclusion is at the root and the assumptions at the leaves. However this
format involves a good deal of redundancy,25 and we therefore resort to a different
more concise format that is better suited to algorithmic treatment.26 In this new format
proofs are still represented by trees, but these trees branch downwards (like Smullyan’s
Tableaux). The premises of each application of the intelim or the falsum rules do not
occur on adjacent branches, but on the same branch as the conclusion, and anywhere
23For a recent contribution that makes use of a restricted version of standard Gentzen-style natural deduc-
tion in the context of formal argumentation theory see [36].
24By contrast, in Gentzen-style natural deduction, ∨ elimination and→-introduction are discharge rules.
25 Whenever a formula inferred from assumptions is used more than once as a premise of further infer-
ences, its proof tree has to be replicated.
26See [24, Section 8].
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INTRODUCTION RULES
ϕ ψ
∧I
ϕ ∧ ψ
¬ϕ
¬∧ I1
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
¬ψ
¬∧ I2
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
¬ϕ ¬ψ
¬∨ I
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
ϕ
∨I1
ϕ ∨ ψ
ψ
∨I2
ϕ ∨ ψ
ϕ ¬ψ
¬→ I
¬(ϕ→ ψ)
¬ϕ
→ I1
ϕ→ ψ
ψ
→ I2
ϕ→ ψ
ϕ
¬¬I
¬¬ϕ
ELIMINATION RULES
ϕ ∨ ψ ¬ϕ
∨E1
ψ
ϕ ∨ ψ ¬ψ
∨E2
ϕ
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
¬∨ E1
¬ϕ
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
¬∨ E2
¬ψ
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ϕ
¬∧ E1
¬ψ
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ψ
¬∧ E2
¬ϕ
ϕ ∧ ψ
∧E1
ϕ
ϕ ∧ ψ
∧E2
ψ
ϕ→ ψ ϕ
→ E1
ψ
ϕ→ ψ ¬ψ
→ E2
¬ϕ
¬(ϕ→ ψ)
¬→ E1
ϕ
¬(ϕ→ ψ)
¬→ E2
¬ψ
¬¬ϕ
¬¬E
ϕ
Table 1: The intelim rules.
above it. So, the application of these rules is sequential, and we call an intelim se-
quence for Γ any sequence of formulae generated in this way. On the other hand, each
application of RB splits an intelim sequence into two branches: one containing a for-
mula ϕ and the other its negation ¬ϕ, as in the examples displayed in Figure 4. In
this case we say that RB has been applied to ϕ, and ϕ is the RB-formula of this RB
application. Every application of RB introduces, on each branch, an extra assumption,
that we call virtual to distinguish it from the actual assumptions that are usually listed
at the top, starting from the root. For example, in the leftmost branch of the first tree
in Figure 4, the formula ¬q is obtained from the actual assumption p → ¬q at the top
of the tree and from the virtual assumption p by means of an application of the rule
→ E1; and r is obtained from the derived formula ¬q and the actual assumption q ∨ r
by means of an application of ∨E1. [22, 23] argue that the minimum number of nested
applications of RB required to develop a deductive argument, provides a natural and
plausible measure of the ‘difficulty’ involved in constructing it.
In the sequel we shall use the expression “tree of formulae” as an abbreviation of
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ϕ ¬ϕ
RNC
uprise
uprise
XFQ
ϕ
Γ, [ϕ]
D1
ψ
∆, [¬ϕ]
D2
ψ
RB
ψ
Table 2: Falsum rules and RB
“tree whose nodes (except possibly the root) are labelled with formulae”. The special
case when the root is unlabelled will be used to represent proofs from the empty set of
assumptions (starting with an application of the RB rule).
Definition 30. [C-intelim trees, proofs, refutations] A C-intelim tree based on a set
Γ is a tree of formulae such that Γ is the set of all its actual assumptions and every
other node results from the application of one of the C-intelim rules. A C-intelim proof
of ϕ depending on Γ is a C-intelim tree based on Γ such that (i) ϕ occurs as the final
formula in every branch and (ii) all actual assumptions in Γ are used as premises of
some rule application. A C-intelim refutation of Γ is a C-intelim proof of uprise depending
on Γ.
C-intelim is sound and complete for classical propositional logic: if ϕ is a classical
consequence of Γ, then there is a C-intelim proof of ϕ depending on some ∆ ⊆ Γ.
Figure 4 shows examples of C-intelim proof trees. The actual assumptions are marked
with a ∗.
A crucial role for practical applications in classical logic argumentation is played
by normal C-Intelim proofs. These normal proofs can be generated by straightfoward
restrictions on the applications of the rules that (i) limit the choice of the RB-formula of
an RB-application to a tractable space defined by the assumptions and the conclusion
and (ii) avoid obvious redundancies in the construction of a proof. More specifically
normal C-intelim proofs: (a) enjoy the (weak) subformula property27, which makes
their construction amenable to algorithmic treatment, and (b) do not allow the con-
struction of R-contaminated arguments (as described in Section 3.6, Definition 22).
It can be shown (see [24]) that restricting to normal C-intelim proofs involves no
loss of deductive power in that for each C-intelim proof there exists a normal one with
the same assumptions and the same conclusion. The simple restrictions on the con-
struction of normal C-intelim proofs ensure that such proofs are not trivially redundant
(see [24] for a discussion). This allows us to bar convoluted proofs such as those
shown on the left in each of Figure 5 (a), (b), (c) and (d) and to generate the normal
ones on the right instead. In particular, notice the redundant proof in Figure 5(a), which
makes contrived use of an assumption (¬q) that is syntactically disjoint from the other
assumptions and from the conclusion.
27Every formula occurring in the proof is a subformula of the premises or of the conclusion, or the negation
of such a subformula.
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p! ¬q⇤
q _ r⇤
¬(r ^ ¬q)⇤
p _ t⇤
(t _ u)! ¬s⇤
¬v ! s⇤
p
¬q
r
¬¬q
f
v
 T
¬p
t
t _ u
¬s
¬¬v
v
(p _ z)! q⇤
¬(¬p ^ r)⇤
(q _ s)! (t! v)⇤
(q _ s)! (¬v ! t)⇤
¬(r ^ s)! (u! v)⇤
¬r ! (¬u! (p _ r))⇤
p _ z
q
q _ s
t! v
¬v ! t
t
v
 TT
¬t
¬¬v
v
,, ll
¬(p _ z)
¬p
¬r
¬(r ^ s)
u! v
¬u! (p _ r)
u
v
 TT
¬u
p _ r
f
v
p! q⇤
p! ¬q⇤
p
q
¬q
f
¬p
   AA
¬p
1
Figure 4: C-intelim proofs. Actual assumptions are marked with “*”.
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p∗
¬q∗
p ∨ q
p
; p∗
(a) p,¬q ` p
p∗
¬p∗
p ∨ q
q
;
p∗
¬p∗
uprise
q
(b) p,¬p ` q
p∗
¬(p ∨ q)∗
p ∨ q
uprise
;
p∗
¬(p ∨ q)∗
¬p
uprise
(c) p,¬(p ∨ q) ` uprise
p∗
¬p∗
uprise
q
q ∨ r
;
p∗
¬p∗
uprise
q ∨ r
(d) p,¬p ` q ∨ r
Figure 5: Convoluted proofs are shown on the left, and their non-convoluted versions are shown on the right.
Connection links between nodes have been removed for ease of presentation.
4.1.2. Depth-bounded Instantiations of pDCF s
One of the main advantages of C-intelim deduction is that, unlike standard natural
deduction, it immediately provides a sharp measure of the depth of an argument that
can be associated with the resources required for its construction.
In the sequel we shall restrict our attention to normal C-intelim proofs.
Definition 31. [Depth of C-intelim proofs] The depth of a C-intelim proof T is the
maximum number of virtual assumptions occurring in a branch of T .
A C-intelim proof of depth 0 contains no virtual assumptions, i.e., no application of
RB (and is therefore a C-intelim sequence). A C-intelim proof of depth k contains at
most k nested applications of RB. Consider the rightmost C-intelim proof in Figure 4
which makes use of one application of RB. A reasoning agent (whether human or ar-
tificial) with actual assumptions p → q and p → ¬q considered true, does not possess
the information that ¬p is true, unless it is able to simulate information states contain-
ing virtual assumptions. This is a non-trivial step both from the computational (and
arguably cognitive) viewpoint, and the depth at which the iterated use of such virtual
assumptions is required is an interesting measure of the computational effort involved
in extracting the information (¬p) implicitly contained in the actual assumptions. Let
C-Intelimk be the system allowing only (normal) C-intelim proofs of depth ≤ k.
Definition 32. [C-Intelimk] Let `k⊆ 2L × L be defined as follows:
Γ `k ϕ if and only if there is a C-intelimk proof of ϕ depending on some ∆ ⊆ Γ.
Proposition 47. For each k ∈ N, whether or not Γ `k ϕ can be decided in time
O(nk+2), where n is the total number of occurrences of symbols in Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
For a proof see [23].
The relations `k of Definition 32 form a sequence of increasingly powerful de-
ducibility relations that are all (by Proposition 47) tractable and converge to classical
propositional logic, which is the limit of the sequence for k approaching infinity.
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Definition 33. [k-depth C-intelim arguments] Let T be any normal C-intelimk proof
of ϕ depending on Σ (recall – Definition 30 – that Σ are the actual, and not virtual
assumptions in T ), where ∀α ∈ Σ, α is annotated in T by p© or s©, where p© stands
for “premise” and s© stands for “supposition”.
Then (∆,Γ, ϕ) is a C-intelimk argument, where ∆ ∪ Γ = Σ, α ∈ ∆ iff α is annotated
by p©, and α ∈ Γ iff α is annotated by s©. We call (∆,Γ, ϕ) the C-intelimk argument
associated with T .
A set A of C-intelimk arguments is defined by B if ∀X ∈ A, assumptions(X) ⊆ B.
The following key result is shown in [24]:
Proposition 48. If T is a normal C-intelimk proof of ϕ depending on Γ, then the C-
intelimk argument associated with T is not R-contaminated.
Moreover [24] shows that if an argument associated with T is contaminated, and so
given Proposition 48, can only by E-contaminated (e.g. a proof of q from p,¬p), then:
Proposition 49. If an argument associated with a normal C-intelimk proof T depend-
ing on Γ is E-contaminated, then the proof is said to be improper in that every branch
in the downward-branching tree ends with an application of XFQ (and so Γ `c uprise.).
Remark 50. [24] shows that it is easy to turn an improper proof into a proof ofuprise (i.e.,
a refutation) of the same depth.
Proposition 48 shows that normal proofs satisfy a basic relevance requirement,
which is, however, weaker than the standard requirement that an argument’s assump-
tions are subset-minimal. For example, recalling the discussion in Section 3.2, and
in particular Footnote 8 on p. 12, one could build an argument for q depending on
{p, p → r, p → q, r → ((p → q) → q)} which is not R-contaminated and in which
all the assumptions are actually used (i.e., it is relevant in the sense of relevance logic),
although it is not subset-miminal.
We now formally instantiate non-redundant pdAF s (recall Definition 25) with C-
intelimk arguments. Firstly, we show that given a non-redundant pdAF instantiated
by C-intelimk arguments, then the conditions P1 – P4′ and P5 on the arguments in the
pdAF can be satisfied. This follows from the following result:
Proposition 51. Let A be any set of C-intelimk arguments defined by B. Then there
exists a set A′ ⊇ A of C-intelimk arguments defined by B such that A′ satisfies P1
–P4′ and P5.
PROOF. Proposition 48 states that P5 is satisfied by any set of C-intelimk arguments.
P1 is trivially satisfied, since for any depth n ≥ 0, α ∈ B implies ({α},∅, α) ∈ A′.
P2 is trivially satisfied given that logically equivalent arguments are of equal depth. P3
is satisfied given the following result:
Let (∆,∅, α) and (Γ,∅, α) be C-intelimk arguments. Then either
(∆,∅,uprise) or (Γ,∅,uprise) or (∆ ∪ Γ,∅,uprise) are C-intelimk arguments. (10)
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Given the structure of (normal) C-intelimk arguments, the proof of (10) follows again
from results in [24]. In particular, if one of the two arguments is improper, then it is
easy to turn its proof into a normal refutation of the same depth (remark 50). If neither
is improper, then it is easy to combine the two arguments via a single application of the
RNC rule to obtain an argument of the same depth concluding to uprise. For P4’, observe
that given satisfaction of P5 and Remark 33, it suffices to show that:
Let (∆,Γ, α) be a C-intelimk argument such that ∆ ∪ Γ‖α. Then
there exists a C-intelimk argument (∆,Γ,uprise).
(11)
This is again straightforward given that such an argument cannot be R-contaminated,
hence is E-contaminated, improper, and easily turned into an argument concluding uprise.
QED
Proposition 51 allows instantiation of a non-redundant pdAF by C-intelimk argu-
ments:
Definition 34. [C-intelimk non-redundantpdAF] A C-intelimk non-redundant pdAF
defined by B and ≺ is a tuple (A,D) where A is any set of C-intelimk arguments sat-
isfying P1, P2, P3, P4′ and P5.
The results in Sections 3.4 and 3.7.1 show that the consistency and closure postulates
are satisfied by C-intelimk non-redundant pdAF s defined by any B and ≺, and the
non-interference and crash resistance postulates are satisfied under the assumption that
≺ satisfy Pref1 (given that P5 is satisfied, it is not necessary that ≺ satisfies relevance-
coherence).
Example 52. We conclude by recalling the example in Section 3.2, on p. 13, in which
[43] requires that X , Y and Z = ({p → q, p → ¬q},∅,¬p) can be constructed, to
ensure no admissible extension can contain arguments with premises p, p → q and
p → ¬q. However, suppose a 0-depth C-intelim pdAF (A,D). Then A does not
contain the 1-depth argument Z (the rightmost proof in Figure 4), but does contain the
0-depth arguments ({p, p → ¬q},∅,¬q), ({p, p → q},∅, q) and (∅, {p, p → q, p →
¬q},uprise).
4.2. A Resource-Bounded Dialectical Characterisation of Preferred Subtheories
Section 2.1 reviewed [43]’s argumentation-based characterisation of non-monotonic
inference relations defined by Preferred Subtheories [13]. Recall that arguments are
defined by a totally ordered base, and the Elitist preference relation is used. We now
provide a dialectical resource-bounded characterisation of Brewka’s non-monotonic
inference relations. First, we show that the Elitist preference relation, defined for the
more general case of a base equipped with a partial preordering ≤ (where as usual <
is defined as α < β iff α ≤ β and β  α) is a coherent strict partial ordering.
Definition 35. [Elitist Preference Ordering] Let X,Y be dialectical classical logic
arguments defined by a base B, and ≤ a partial preordering over B. Then X ≺E Y iff
∃α ∈ assumptions(X) such that ∀β ∈ assumptions(Y ), α < β.
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Proposition 53. [Properties of Elitist Preferences]≺E is a strict partial ordering, in-
variant modulo logical equivalence (imle), dialectically coherent, and relevance-coherent.
PROOF. In this proof we abuse notation writing α ∈ A instead of α ∈ assumptions(A).
• ≺E is a strict partial ordering:
Irreflexivity: Suppose for contradiction that X ≺E Y and Y ≺E X . Then ∃α ∈ X s.t.
∀β ∈ Y , α < β, and ∃β ∈ Y s.t. ∀α ∈ X , β < α. But then for some α, β, α < β and
β < α, contradicting the asymmetry of the strict partial ordering <.
Asymmetry: Suppose for contradiction that X ≺E X . Then ∃α ∈ X s.t. α < α,
contradicting the irreflexivity of <.
Transitivity: SupposeX ≺E Y ≺E Z. Firstly, Y ≺E Z implies assumptions(Y ) 6= ∅
and ∃β ∈ Y s.t. ∀γ ∈ Z, β < γ. By assumption of X ≺E Y , ∃α ∈ assumptions(X)
s.t. α < β. Hence by transitivity of <, ∀γ ∈ Z, α < γ. Hence X ≺E Z.
• ≺E is imle. Suppose X ≺E Y , and X ′ ∈ [X], Y ′ ∈ [Y ]. Then assumptions(X ′) =
assumptions(X) and assumptions(Y ′) = assumptions(Y ). Hence X ′ ≺E Y ′.
• ≺E is dialectically coherent. For the proof of Pref1, consider any X = (∅,∆,uprise).
By the properties of classical logic, ∆ is a non-empty finite (since B is finite) set
{α1, . . . , αn}. Suppose for contradiction that ∀i: X ≺E ({αi},∅, αi). Abusing nota-
tion by representing arguments by their assumptions, we have the sequence:
S1 = {α1, . . . , αn} ≺ {α1} . . . Sn = {α1, . . . , αn} ≺ αn
1. For S1, by irreflexivity of <, α1 ≮ α1. If n = 1, then this contradicts S1. Else
we can assume without loss of generality that α2 < α1.
2. For S2, by asymmetry and irreflexivity of <, α1 ≮ α2, α2 ≮ α2. If n = 2, then
this contradicts S2. Else, we can assume without loss of generality that α3 < α2.
3. For S3, by transitivity of <, α3 < α1, and so by asymmetry and irreflexivity
α1 ≮ α3, α2 ≮ α3, α3 ≮ α3. If n = 3, then this contradicts S3. Else, we can
assume without loss of generality that α4 < α3.
4. It is easy to see that one can continue reasoning in the same way, until for Sn,
αi ≮ αn for i = 1 . . . n, contradicting Sn.
For the proof of Pref2, let X = ({α},∅, α), Y = (∆,∅, α) and Y ′ = (∆ ∪ {α},∅, φ).
Suppose Y ≺E X . Then ∃β ∈ assumptions(Y ) s.t. β < α. Since assumptions(Y ) ⊂
assumptions(Y ′), Y ′ ≺E X .
• ≺E is relevance-coherent. Suppose Y = (∆,∅, α) ≺E X . Hence ∃β ∈ ∆, and so
β ∈ ∆ ∪ Γ for any Y ′ = (∆ ∪ Γ,∅, α), s.t. ∀α ∈ assumptions(X): β < α. QED
We now adapt [13]’s Preferred Subtheories so as to accommodate agents whose
classical reasoning is resource-bounded:
Definition 36. [Resource bounded Preferred Subtheories] Let `r ⊆`c be a resource-
bounded classical consequence relation, such that: 1) for any ∆, if β ∈ ∆ then ∆ `r β;
2) if ∆ `r α and ∆ `r ¬α then ∆ `r uprise. We say that ∆ is r-inconsistent iff ∆ `r uprise;
r-consistent otherwise.
Let (B,≤) be a totally ordered set of propositional wff and let B1, . . . ,Bn be a partition
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of B such that for all α ∈ Bi, and all β ∈ Bj , i < j iff β < α. An r-preferred subtheory
Σ is a set Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σn such that for i = 1, . . . , n, Σ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Σi is a ⊂-maximal
r-consistent subset of B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bi.
We now show a correspondence between the r-preferred subtheories of a base B and
the stable extensions of a pdAF defined by B, and using Elitist preferences. Note that
in what follows we use the notation Args(Σ) = {X|prem(X) ⊆ Σ}.
Theorem 54. Let (A,D) be defined by B and ≺E be defined on the basis of a total
ordering ≤ over B, and such that (∆,Γ, α) ∈ A iff ∆ ∪ Γ `r α. Then:
1) If Σ is an r-preferred subtheory of B, then E = Args(Σ) is a stable extension of
(A,D).
2) If E is a stable extension of (A,D), then Σ = ⋃X∈E Prem(X) is an r-preferred
subtheory of B.
PROOF.
Proof of 1): We show E is conflict free. Since Σ is r-consistent, Σ 0r uprise. Suppose for
contradiction that E is not conflict free, in which case ∃X,Y ∈ E s.t. X = (∆,Γ, φ)
(φ = uprise or β) and X ⇒E Y on β ∈ prem(Y ). Since ∆ ⊆ prem(E) and Γ ⊆ prem(E)
(given Y ∈ E), then φ = uprise implies Σ `r uprise. φ = β implies Σ `r β and since
β ∈ prem(Y ), Σ `r β. Hence Σ `r uprise. Contradiction.
We show ∀Y ∈ A \ E, ∃X ∈ E s.t. X ⇒{Y } Y . Consider any such Y (Y can-
not be an argument of the form (∅,∆, φ) since any such Y is in E = Args(Σ)).
Then ∃γ ∈ prem(Y ), γ /∈ Σ. By construction, Σ = Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σn such that for
i = 1 . . . n, Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σi is a maximal r-consistent subset of B1, . . . ,Bi. Hence,
suppose γ ∈ Bj for some j = 1 . . . n. Then Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σj ∪ {γ} `r uprise. Hence
∃X = (∆, {γ},uprise) ∈ Args(Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σj), and so X ∈ E. Since γ ∈ Bj , and
∆ ⊆ ⋃jk=1 Bk, then X ⊀E ({γ},∅, γ). Hence X ⇒{Y } Y on γ.
Proof of 2): We show that Σ =
⋃
X∈E Prem(X) is r-consistent. Suppose for contra-
diction that Σ `r uprise. Then Z = (∅,∆,uprise) ∈ A for some ∆ ⊆ Σ. Hence ∀α ∈ ∆,
∃B ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒E B on α28, contradicting E is stable.
Now let Σ1, . . . ,Σn be the partition of the r-consistent Σ s.t. for i = 1 . . . n, Σi
is a (possibly empty) subset of Bi in the stratification B1, . . . ,Bn of B. Suppose for
contradiction that for some i, Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σi is not a ⊂-maximal r-consistent subset
of B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bi. Without loss of generality we can assume that for k = 1 . . . i − 1,
Σ1, . . . ,Σk is a ⊂-maximal r-consistent subset of B1, . . . ,Bi−1. Then ∃α ∈ Bi s.t.
i) α /∈ Σi ii) Σ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Σi−1 ∪ Σi ∪ {α} 0r uprise.
Given i), Y = ({α},∅, α) /∈ E. Since E is stable, ∃X ∈ E, X ⇒{Y } Y , where:
a) X = (∆, {α},uprise) or b) X = (∆, {α}, α) or c) X = (∆,∅, α).
Note that since E is stable then E is complete (see immediately following Definition
15 and Footnote 15). Suppose either Z = (∆,∅,uprise) ∈ A or ({α},∅,uprise) ∈ A. The
28Note also that by virtue of ≺E satisfying Pref1 it must be that ∃α ∈ ∆ s.t. Z ⊀E ({α},∅, α) and so
∃B ∈ E s.t. Z ⇒E B on α
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former contradicts X ∈ E is acceptable w.r.t. E (given that Z ′ = (∅,∆,uprise) ∈ A and
Z ′ ⇒E X), and the latter implies {α} `r uprise, contradicting ii).
Let us now renameX in c) toX ′, and in b) we have (by P2)X ′ = (∆∪{α},∅, α) ∈ A.
For both instances of X ′, and having shown (∆,∅,uprise) /∈ A and ({α},∅,uprise) /∈ A, we
have by P3 that (∆ ∪ {α},∅,uprise) ∈ A. These cases and case a) imply ∆ ∪ {α} `r uprise.
But then given ii) and ∆ ⊆ Σ1, . . . ,Σn, it must be that ∃β ∈ ∆, s.t. β ∈ Σj , j > i.
But then in cases a), b) and c), X ≺E Y , contradicting X ⇒{Y } Y . QED
The above correspondence yields a resource bounded dialectical characterisation
of non-monotonic inference in Preferred Subtheories (both sceptical and credulous in-
ference relations, as described in Section 2.1).
5. Related Work
Design guidelines for theoretical models of argumentation suitable for real world
applications29 have been proposed by Dung et.al. in [27]. Firstly, submitted arguments
and attacks should be transparent (Postulate 2.1) in that the computational cost of ver-
ifying: 1) the legitimacy of submitted arguments should be at most polynomial in the
size of the (constructed) arguments; 2) that an argument attacks another should be at
most linear (in the size of the argument’s conclusion). Our approach satisfies the first
desideratum30, since we drop the consistency and subset minimality checks on argu-
ments’ assumptions, which is what makes legitimacy checks intractable under a widely
accepted conjecture in computational complexity. By contrast, the time required to
check the correctness of a constructed proof is bounded above by a polynomial in the
size of the proof31. As for the second desideratum, we note that it is satisfied by the
purely “declarative” notion of attack in Definition 11. However, we also make essen-
tial use of the more complex notion of dialectical defeat in Definition 15, that allows
the defeating argument X to include, as suppositions, any premises of arguments in
the extension S with respect to which the acceptability of the defeated argument Y is
challenged. This notion of defeat can be checked in polynomial time with respect to
suppositions(X)∪prem(S∪{Y })∪{conclusion(X)}32. Transparency guarantees that
constructed arguments and defeats can be understood by any parties, independently of
their level of sophistication [27], with a use of resources which is polynomial with re-
spect to the complexity of the input33. We go one step further in this paper, arguing
against the assumption that an agent constructs all arguments defined by a base; in
particular because they may be resource bounded. Hence we drop the consistency and
29The guidelines are stated in the context of applications involving computational and/or human agents.
30This requirement was first put forward by Cook and Rechow, in their seminal [18].
31This depends on the proof system adopted, but is certainly true for natural deduction systems like the
one presented in Section 4. Indeed, we are unaware of any conventional proof systems for classical logic
whose proofs cannot be verified in polynomial time.
32Note also, that in practice, the check can be restricted to the subset S′ of S consisting of the arguments
of S whose premises are actually referenced in suppositions(X) (recall Footnote 14 on page 18).
33For dialectical defeats, the input includes, besides the conclusion, the suppositions of the defeating
argument, the defeated argument Y , and the set S with respect to which it is intended as a defeat.
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subset minimality checks on arguments’ assumptions, and formally study partially in-
stantiated frameworks. Moreover, for depth-bounded instantiations (see Section 4.1.2),
it is worth noting that even finding a C-intelimk proof takes time at most polynonial in
the size of the input assumptions and conclusion (see Proposition 47).
Secondly, an argument’s assumptions should be relevant to its conclusion (Postu-
late 2.2), at least in the “weaker sense [...] that the argument is a defeasible proof of
its claim from its support, without any obvious redundancy of any parts of the support”
[27, p. 187, our emphasis]. In this paper we propose an analogous notion of “obvious”
redundancy in terms of the syntactic unrelatedness of some part of the assumptions
to the other assumptions and to the conclusion, which unlike that imposed by subset
minimality, can be enforced proof theoretically (as shown in Section 4).
Thirdly, the no dismissal postulate (Postulate 2.3) proposes that legitimate argu-
ments should not be dismissed without reason, and if dismissed (i.e., not submitted),
their dismissal should not change the semantics of the given argumentation framework.
We concur in the sense that all arguments constructed must be included in a pdAF , un-
less their exclusion does not change the semantics. Related to the no dismissal postu-
late, ‘redundant’ arguments are distinguished from ‘non-redundant’ arguments in [27],
where some Y is redundant if there is an X that attacks every Z that is attacked by
Y , and any Z attacking X also attacks Y . One can then, having partitioned all the
arguments defined by a base, exclude those that are redundant, while guaranteeing that
the status of non-redundant arguments will remain unchanged.
A key feature of our approach is the distinction between premises accepted as true,
and suppositions assumed true for the sake of argument. One can thus model the
dialectical move of showing that an interlocutor’s supposed premises, together with
premises accepted as true, imply a contradiction. Caminada [14] is similarly motivated
to develop accounts of argumentation for application in dialogues involving human and
computational agents. He formalises what he terms ‘hang yourself’ (HY) arguments
built from a language consisting of premises that are literals – atomic propositions and
their negations – as well as defeasible rules L0 ∧ . . . Ln−1 ⇒ Ln and ‘foreign com-
mitments’ L. The latter refer to premises and conclusions of rules in attacked argu-
ments, by way of supposing these to be true for the sake of argument. HY arguments
can only reference premises or conclusions in an attacked argument Y (rather than in
additional arguments used to defend Y ). Clearly, Caminada is concerned with formal-
ising intuitions similar to ours, albeit in a more restricted logical setting, only under the
grounded semantics, and without accommodating the use of preferences. Satisfaction
of rationality postulates is not studied in [14].
It is worth noting at this point that the distinction between premises and supposi-
tions in (∆, {φ1, . . . , φn}, ψ) cannot equivalently be made using the standard ontology,
by an argument (∆, φ1, . . . , φn → ψ). This does not faithfully represent the intuitive
meaning of the conditional claim because of the well-known qualms concerning the use
of material implication to express a kind of entailment [5]. For example, most reason-
ers would not be prepared to accept that the falsity of such a conditional claim implies
that all the φi are factually true, nor that the factual falsity of one of the premises in φi
implies that the claim is true. Moreover, one would then either only be able to use such
arguments as attacks on sets of premises rather than individual premises, or require that
the premises of the attacked argument contain ¬(φ1, . . . , φn → ψ).
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Recently, pragmatic considerations also motivate dropping consistency and sub-
set minimality checks on propositional arguments in [6, 7]. Arguments are Gentzen
style sequents and arguments with inconsistent premises are attacked by sequents with
empty antecedents. In this work, the distinction between premises and suppositions,
and the use of preferences are not considered. The postulates in [15] are not studied
and neither is there consideration of partially instantiated frameworks. Types of redun-
dancy in arguments are also identified in the context of assumption based argumenta-
tion (ABA), and are excluded by switching from a conception of arguments as trees to
graphs [19]. While ABA does not capture classical logic argumentation, insights from
[19] may potentially usefully be studied in the setting of Cl-Arg.
A key study of propositional classical logic instantiations of Dung AF s [33] con-
siders various definitions of attacks amongst a (in general infinite) set of arguments de-
fined by a base, and study (without use of preferences) consistency postulates closely
related to those in [15] and the premise consistency postulate described here in Section
3.4. The two attack relations shown to be well behaved are those in which the attacking
argument’s conclusion is classically equivalent to, respectively classically entails, the
negation of a premise in the attacked argument34. Note that neither of these two attack
definitions satisfy condition 2) of the transparency postulate described above.
[43]’s study of classical logic argumentation with preferences, as an instance of the
ASPIC+ framework, has been reviewed (in Section 2) and compared with our approach
at various points in this paper. In summary, the ASPIC+ instantiation requires checks
on the consistency of arguments’ premises and does not model the dialectical demon-
stration that a set of arguments’ premises are inconsistent. While the foreign com-
mitment problem has been addressed in [17], by allowing attacks on arguments’ con-
clusions in a version of ASPIC+ that accommodates classical logic instantiations, the
consistency and closure rationality postulates of [15] only then hold for the grounded
semantics, and then only if argument preferences are defined by a totally ordered base
B under the Elitist principle [17]. In this paper we have argued that subset minimality
is a blunt and prohibitively expensive35 instrument for ensuring non-redundancy of an
argument’s premises. As already discussed, ASPIC+ also eschews subset minimality
checks on arguments’ premises, and show that the argumentation defined inferences re-
main unchanged under the assumption that preference relations do not strengthen non-
subset minimal arguments. We have advocated a notion of non-redundancy defined in
terms of the syntactic relatedness of formulae; one that can be enforced through appro-
priate restrictions on applications of proof rules in which case no such assumption on
preference relations is required.
Satisfaction of the non-interference and crash resistance postulates [16] is not stud-
ied for the ASPIC+ formalisation of Cl-Arg. Consistency and closure are satisfied
34Both these attacks are shown to be equivalent to the undermine attacks used in this paper, in the sense
that the complete extensions are the same (even when assuming use of preferences) [43].
35Note that there are attempts to ameliorate the computational expense of the consistency and subset
minimality checks; most notably [29], in which algorithms are implemented for generating arguments whose
claims are clauses, from propositional knowledge bases in clausal form, where connection graphs are used to
reduce the computational expense. Tests on these implementations yield encouraging results, and the authors
indicate that a comprehensive empirical evaluation will be the subject of future work.
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by complete extensions, for a restricted class of (reasonable) preference relations, and
assuming all arguments defined by a base are included in anAF . However we show di-
rect consistency for admissible extensions, and (modified) closure postulates for com-
plete extensions, assuming arbitrary preference relations and for partially instantiated
frameworks. Note that recent work [28] studies propositional instantiations of AF s
that combine strict and defeasible rules, and without use of preferences. [28] shows
that to guarantee closure and consistency, it is not necessary that the strict inference
rules satisfy the property of contraposition (see [15, 43]). Their aim is different to
ours. We consider first order classical logic instantiations with preferences in which
all arguments are definable by a base, while we drop the assumption that all such ar-
guments are constructed and included in a framework in order to ensure satisfaction of
closure, consistency and the non-contamination postulates.
A number of works attempt to show satisfaction of the non-interference and crash
resistance postulates for propositional argumentation formalisms that integrate deduc-
tive and defeasible reasoning. In [16], propositional logic programming and Default
Logic [54] instantiations of Dung frameworks are shown to satisfy these postulates un-
der the semi-stable semantics. In [61], arguments are built from a set of classically
consistent propositional formulae P , and defeasible (D) and strict inference rules. The
latter encode only those classical inferences ∆ `c α such that the atoms in ∆ ∪ {α}
are a subset of the atoms appearing in P and D. [61] relate the constructed arguments
by attacks and so do not consider the use of preferences. Inconsistent arguments are
identified as those whose contained premises together with the conclusions of defeasi-
ble rules are classically inconsistent. They then show satisfaction of the consistency,
closure, non-interference and crash resistance postulates for ‘inconsistency cleansed’
Dung frameworks in which inconsistent arguments are excluded. Finally, [34] define
a version of the ASPIC+ framework in which the strict inference rules encode infer-
ence in [55]’s paraconsistent logic. Essentially, arguments are built from premises,
defeasible inference rules and strict inference rules, where the latter encode classi-
cal inferences from only consistent sets of formulae. [34] focus on showing that the
adapted ASPIC+ framework satisfies closure and consistency postulates. Satisfaction
of non-interference and crash resistance is not shown (although the authors state that
satisfaction of these postulates can be taken for granted given the absence of the Ex
Falso principle).
Finally, note that this paper revises and substantially extends [25]. We have re-
vised the definition of attacks and defeats originating from arguments concluding uprise,
modified the conditions on arguments in pdAF s, and specified a new class of non-
redundant frameworks that exclude R-contaminated arguments. The closure and con-
sistency postulates are satisfied for a restricted class of preference relations in [25],
whereas this paper shows satisfaction of these postulates for arbitrary preference rela-
tions. This paper also additionally: 1) formally proves the Fundamental Lemma and
existence of a unique least fixed point of a pdAF ’s characteristic function; 2) provides
a comprehensive study of two types of contaminated arguments; 3) formally proves the
non-interference and crash resistance postulates, generalised here to first order argu-
mentation; 4) studies instantiation of pdAF s by natural deduction proof theories that
exclude R-contaminated arguments and accommodate agents that have bounds on their
inferential capabilities.
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6. Conclusions
Dung’s theory of argumentation has been proposed as a basis for applications, in
large part because of its provision of intuitive dialectical characterisations of non-
monotonic inference for individual and distributed (dialogical) reasoning accommo-
dating computational and human agents. We have argued that such applications re-
quire that the theory account for resource bounded agents and features of real-world
dialectical reasoning. Our focus has been on classical logic instantiations of Dung ar-
gumentation frameworks (Cl-Arg) that yield non-monotonic inference relations over
first order knowledge bases. We have shown that features of current formulations of
Cl-Arg that suffice to ensure satisfaction of rationality postulates, preclude satisfaction
of these practical desiderata. We have thus been motivated to formalise an account of
Cl-Arg that is both practical and rational.
Our solution is to essentially account for the dialectical use of argument by refining
the ontology of arguments so as to make explicit the epistemic distinction between an
argument’s premises assumed true, and those supposed true for the sake of argument.
Our approach can thus accommodate a ubiquitous feature of argumentative practice,
whereby the inconsistency of arguments’ premises is demonstrated dialectically. We
eschew the computationally unfeasible checks on the consistency and subset minimal-
ity of arguments’ premises that are used to verify the legitimacy of arguments prior to
inclusion in an AF , and enumerate minimal and intuitive assumptions as to the argu-
ments constructed from a base for inclusion in an AF , such that they suffice to ensure
rational outcomes. In particular: 1) arguments with conflicting conclusions are obvi-
ously indicative of the inconsistency of their supporting assumptions, as recognised by
inclusion of an argument that combines the assumptions to conclude uprise; 2) construc-
tion of an argument whose support makes use of redundant premises that contaminate
an argument, implies construction of the non-contaminated argument excluding the
redundant premises. We have shown that assuming only partially instantiated frame-
works (pdAF s), key properties of Dung frameworks are satisfied. Also, the consis-
tency and closure postulates are satisfied assuming arbitrary preference relations, with
consistency being shown for admissible (and not just complete) extensions; a result
that we argue is important for practical applications in which it often suffices to de-
fend an argument by showing membership in an admissible extension. We have also
identified a notion of redundancy of an argument’s assumptions that does not appeal to
subset minimality, but rather to the syntactic relatedness of the assumptions and con-
clusion, such that redundant arguments that make use of syntactically disjoint assump-
tions can be excluded proof theoretically. Thus non-redundant pdAF s instantiated by
proof theories that exclude redundant arguments, trivially satisfy condition 2) above.
Moreover, we have shown that despite dropping the legitimacy checks on arguments,
pdAF s satisfy the non-interference and crash resistance postulates (which in this pa-
per are generalised to argument frameworks instantiated by first order theories) under
the assumption that preference relations are dialectically and redundance coherent. For
non-redundant pdAF s it suffices that preference relations are dialectically coherent.
Existing accounts of Cl-Arg typically neglect the study of the proof theoretic means
for constructing arguments. We have argued that such accounts provide ‘schemata’ for
classical logic argumentation, as an argument properly constituted should include the
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reasoning steps employed in entailing the conclusion from the premises (in keeping
with the transparency postulate advocated in [27]). We have therefore proposed a
natural deduction proof theory for propositional Cl-Arg that in keeping with practical
desiderata for applications: i) provides a more perspicuous account of classical rea-
soning (in comparison with Gentzen style natural deduction); ii) allows definition of a
hierarchy of tractable depth-bounded deducibility relations equating with stepwise in-
crements in agents’ assumed inferential resources, and such that pdAF s instantiated up
to any given depth meet conditions for satisfaction of the rationality postulates; iii) can
be adapted so that only non-redundant arguments are constructed. We also provided an
argumentative characterisation of the non-monotonic Preferred Subtheories [13], under
the assumption that agents may have limited inferential capabilities.
This paper suggests an ambitious agenda for future work. We are currently gen-
eralising our approach to the ASPIC+ framework [43] in which arguments are built
from strict inference rules that encode the inference relations of deductive logics, as
well as defeasible inference rules and premises. We believe this will pose few serious
challenges, and will involve:
1. Differentially labelling the constituents of ASPIC+ tree structured arguments so
as to distinguish rules and premises that are assumed true and supposed true,
and adapting this paper’s notions of attack defeat and acceptability. Hence, for
example, an argument X concluding uprise would target those defeasible rules and
premises in the attacked argument that are labelled as suppositions in X .
2. Identifying syntactically disjoint subsets of premises and rules in an ASPIC+ ar-
gument so as identify explosively and redundantly contaminated arguments, and
adapting P1, . . . ,P5 and P4′ so as to define (non-redundant) pdAF s. Note that
this may require stipulating assumptions as to the strict rules used in constructing
arguments, such that the property satisfied by classical logic (in Proposition 30)
applies to ASPIC+ arguments36.
With appropriate adaptations of dialectical and redundance coherent preference re-
lations, we then intend showing that partially instantiated frameworks satisfy the con-
sistency and closure postulates (without assumptions on preference relations), and the
non-contamination postulates. Notice that violation of the non-contamination postu-
lates arises because of the encoding of classical logic inference in the strict rules, and
as discussed in Section 5 when reviewing [61], avoiding this problem involves sig-
nificantly compromising the generality of ASPIC+, and ‘cleansing’ the framework of
inconsistent arguments. We therefore aim for satisfaction of these postulates for the
fully general version of ASPIC+ and without any need for cleansing.
Secondly, we intend adapting for pdAF s, argument game proof theories developed
for Dung AF s [42]. We will then generalise these argument games to persuasion di-
alogues in which agents submit arguments constructed from their own bases and the
premises of arguments that are incrementally added to a public commitment store.
We believe these to be important steps in achieving our long term aim of formalising
36By substituting `A+ for `c in the statement of this property, where the former is a relation between sets
of rules and premises, and the conclusions of arguments defined by these sets.
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accounts of monological reasoning and distributed non-monotonic reasoning through
dialogue, suitable for real-world rather than idealised agents. Moreover, this paper has
investigated instantiation of pdAF s by propositional resource bounded proof theories
that exclude redundantly contaminated arguments. An important future research focus
will be the development of first order resource bounded proof theories that exclude
redundantly contaminated arguments.
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